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Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise 
of Fiduciary Principles 
Donna M. Nagy∗
ABSTRACT: In United States v. O’Hagan, the Supreme Court 
established that there are two complementary theories of insider trading 
liability, each with a fiduciary principle at its core. Under the “classical” 
theory, liability is premised on a fiduciary’s deceptive silence about material 
nonpublic information in a securities transaction with corporate 
shareholders. Under the “misappropriation” theory, liability is premised on a 
fiduciary’s deception of the source of the material nonpublic information 
used in the securities transaction. 
 
This Article analyzes the law of insider trading, with a focus on 
developments since O’Hagan. Based on a comprehensive review of lower-
court decisions, settled enforcement proceedings, and rules promulgated by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, it argues that notwithstanding 
the Supreme Court’s explicit dictates, fiduciary principles are often not 
essential to the offense of insider trading. Rather, a host of lower courts and 
the SEC have in effect concluded that insider trading involves the wrongful 
use of material nonpublic information, regardless of whether a fiduciary-like 
duty is breached. Although this conclusion can be justified by the policy 
objectives underlying O’Hagan, it currently lacks a solid doctrinal 
foundation. To resolve this anomaly, this Article offers specific suggestions 
that would bring much needed coherence and legitimacy to the law of insider 
trading. 
 I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1317 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Just over a decade ago, the U.S. Supreme Court established that there 
are two complementary theories of insider trading liability, each with a 
fiduciary principle at its core.1 Under the “classical” theory developed in 
Chiarella v. United States2 and reaffirmed three years later in Dirks v. SEC,3 
corporate insiders violate Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
19344 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder5 when they trade their corporation’s 
securities while aware of material nonpublic information.6 An insider’s 
silence about material facts pertaining to the transaction constitutes 
deception because “a relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between 
the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained 
confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation.”7 
Insiders (namely, officers, directors, and employees) who are aware of 
material nonpublic information are therefore obliged to “disclose or 
abstain” from trading the securities of their corporation.8 The obligation to 
disclose or abstain also extends to temporary agents of the corporations and 
to persons (so-called tippees) who trade securities based on information 
shared with them by an insider.9
Under the alternative “misappropriation” theory endorsed by the Court 
in United States v. O’Hagan,
 
10 persons “outside” the issuing corporation can 
likewise violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.11
 
 1. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (“The two theories are 
complementary, each addressing efforts to capitalize on nonpublic information through the 
purchase or sale of securities.”). 
 Such a violation occurs 
when a fiduciary personally profits from a securities transaction through 
 2. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 3. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.” Id. 
 5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). Rule 10b-5 provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . . [t]o employ any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, . . . or . . . [t]o engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Id. 
 6. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 227–28. 
 9. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655–61 & n.14 (1983). 
 10. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 11. Id. at 652–53. 
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undisclosed use of a principal’s material nonpublic information.12 Thus, as 
the Court explained, whereas the classical theory “premis[es] liability on a 
fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller of 
the company’s stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a 
fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access 
to confidential information.”13 The O’Hagan Court emphasized that the 
misappropriation theory serves the important policy goals of promoting 
market integrity and investor confidence because “investors likely would 
hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on 
misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.”14 The Court 
was clear, however, that the circle of outsiders liable under the 
misappropriation theory was “limited to those who breach[ed] a recognized 
duty” owed to the information’s source.15
 
 12. Id. at 651–52. 
 
 13. Id. at 652. 
 14. Id. at 658. The O’Hagan Court’s understanding of the policy objectives behind the 
federal insider trading proscription mirrors views long held by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”). Indeed, the SEC maintains that “the fundamental unfairness of insider 
trading harms not only individual investors but also the very foundations of our markets, by 
undermining investor confidence in the integrity of the markets.” Selective Disclosure and 
Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 86,319, at 83,692 (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter SEC Adopting Release]; see also Joel 
Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 
1083, 1115 (1985) (contending that “[t]he primary policy reason for proscribing trading while 
in possession of material nonpublic information is to make investors confident that they can 
trade securities without being subject to informational disadvantages”). To be sure, a number of 
securities scholars have challenged the adequacy of market integrity and investor confidence as 
a basis for the federal prohibition. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, 
POLITICS, AND POLICY 67 (1991) (arguing that “[t]he regulation of insider trading cannot be 
justified on the grounds that it promotes the goals of efficiency, fairness, or market integrity” 
and that attempts to regulate on such grounds “simply reflect efforts by a farrago of special 
interest groups to obtain private advantage through the regulatory and legislative process”); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property 
Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1591 (1999) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Path 
Dependent Choice] (arguing that the “insider trading prohibition ought to be viewed as a means 
of protecting property rights in information, rather than as a means of preventing securities 
fraud”); Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123, 171 (1998) 
(arguing that “[m]isappropriation of information is wrong, but we should not make a federal 
case out of it”). The vast literature on the impact of insider trading is reviewed extensively in 18 
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION §§ 1:2 to 
1:6 (2008) [hereinafter LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING] and WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. 
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING §§ 2:1 to 2:4 (2d ed. 2005). This Article, however, does not rehash 
these debates. Rather, it highlights the Supreme Court’s and the SEC’s stated policy objectives 
and questions whether the Court’s fiduciary-based doctrine adequately serves those objectives. 
 15. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666. As discussed more fully in Part II.A, infra, the Supreme 
Court has equated a fiduciary relationship with a “relationship of trust and confidence.” See, e.g., 
id. at 653 (noting that the “indictment alleged that O’Hagan” traded Pillsbury stock “in breach 
of a duty of trust and confidence he owed to his law firm . . . and to its client”); Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (stating that a duty to speak arises out of “‘a fiduciary or 
other similar relation of trust and confidence’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
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Despite the Supreme Court’s explicit dictate that fiduciary principles 
underlie the offense of insider trading, there have been recent repeated 
instances in which lower federal courts and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) have disregarded these principles. On some occasions, 
judicial adherence to fiduciary principles would have dictated rulings in 
favor of defendants charged with insider trading, but courts essentially 
ignored those principles.16 SEC settlements in insider trading cases also 
reflect this disregard.17 On other occasions, courts have ignored fiduciary 
principles where adherence to them would have established the defendant’s 
liability.18 These litigated cases and settled proceedings have a common 
theme: the offense of insider trading involves the wrongful use of material 
nonpublic information, regardless of whether a fiduciary-like duty is 
breached.19
The SEC has also circumvented fiduciary principles with respect to rules 
adopted in the wake of O’Hagan. This circumvention occurred in 
connection with Rule 10b5-1’s affirmative defenses, which allow insiders who 
trade securities while aware of material nonpublic information to avoid 
liability by demonstrating that they traded pursuant to a written plan that 
pre-existed their awareness of such information.
 
20 These affirmative 
defenses clash with the underlying premise of the classical theory: insiders, 
by virtue of their status as fiduciaries, owe disclosure duties to shareholders 
when engaging in securities transactions. The SEC likewise ignored fiduciary 
principles in Rule 10b5-2(b)(1).21
 
§ 551(2)(a) (1977))). Insider trading decisions by lower courts routinely reference “fiduciary-
like” relationships or duties. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 572 (2d Cir. 
1991) (stating that the misappropriation theory requires a “pre-existing fiduciary-like 
relationship between the parties”); SEC v. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d 477, 487 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 
2005) (stating that the “SEC’s complaint sufficiently alleges a fiduciary-like duty under the 
factors set forth in Chestman”). Similarly, Justice Blackmun maintained that the Chiarella 
majority had predicated insider trading liability on a “special relationship akin to fiduciary 
duty.” Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmum, J., dissenting). See also WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 
 That rule extends liability under the 
misappropriation theory to securities transactions based on information 
subject to a confidentiality agreement, regardless of the nature of the 
14, § 5:2 (analyzing Chiarella and its “classical special relationship of trust and 
confidence”). For the sake of brevity, this Article often uses the single term “fiduciary” to 
identify the relationship on which the classical and misappropriation theories are predicated, 
but it does not intend the use of that term to exclude any of these other phraseologies. 
 16. See infra Part III.B.1–3. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 19. These recent outcomes were foreshadowed years in advance of O’Hagan. See Donald C. 
Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 897 (1995) [hereinafter Langevoort, Words from on High] (observing that 
the “law of insider trading suggests an almost organic capacity to impose liability for the unfair 
exploitation of someone else’s information, whatever the overarching doctrinal framework”). 
 20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A) (2008). 
 21. Id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1). 
A4 - NAGY_INITIAL 5/31/2009 7:50 PM 
1320 94  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2009] 
relationship between the trader and the information’s source.22
The decade since O’Hagan has thus taught us much. First, as I argued 
shortly after the decision, O’Hagan’s paradigm of “deception by a fiduciary” 
was not broad enough to encompass cases involving more novel forms of 
trading on misappropriated information.
 Both SEC 
rules, however, are consistent with the view that insider trading involves the 
wrongful use of material nonpublic information regardless of the presence 
of a fiduciary-like duty. 
23
Relatedly, the last ten years reflect a host of outcomes that return 
insider trading law almost full circle to the years preceding Chiarella. Prior to 
Chiarella, lower courts and the SEC maintained that unequal access to 
material nonpublic information triggered a disclosure obligation under 
Rule 10b-5.
 Yet more novel forms of outsider 
trading—such as trading on confidential information stolen by a stranger to 
the source—have the same deleterious effects on securities markets as secret 
trading by a fiduciary. The Court in O’Hagan failed to provide a convincing 
rationale as to why the misappropriation theory is limited to outsiders with a 
fiduciary-like nexus to the information’s source. Accordingly, lower courts, 
encouraged by the SEC, have been willing to allow O’Hagan’s policy 
justifications for the federal insider trading proscription to trump the 
fiduciary-based doctrine actually endorsed by the Court. But a coherent and 
consistent theory of insider trading liability has yet to emerge as an 
alternative to the Court’s classical and misappropriation approaches. 
24
Most importantly, the last decade has demonstrated the urgent need for 
redirection. Rather than allowing lower courts and the SEC to continue on a 
 Chiarella and Dirks rejected this broad-based disclosure duty 
and predicated the disclosure obligation on a fiduciary relationship between 
the parties to the securities transaction. O’Hagan then expanded the 
disclosure obligation to include one that was predicated on a fiduciary 
relationship between the trader–tipper and the source of the information as 
well as on a fiduciary relationship between the trading parties. Today, 
however, insider trading cases do not turn necessarily on the breach of a 
disclosure obligation flowing from a fiduciary-like relationship. Rather, 
numerous lower courts and the SEC have in effect concluded that the 
wrongful use of information constitutes the crux of the insider trading 
offense and that fiduciary principles are only relevant insofar as they 
establish such wrongful use. 
 
 22. Id. (“[A] duty of trust or confidence exists . . . [w]henever a person agrees to maintain 
information in confidence”). 
 23. Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-
O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1251–65 (1998). 
 24. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (defining the 
duty to disclose broadly by stating that “anyone in possession of material inside information is 
an ‘insider’ and must either disclose it to the investing public . . . [or] must abstain from 
trading in or recommending the securities concerned”). 
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course of revisionism and results-oriented decisionmaking, it would be far 
better to replace the classical and misappropriation theories with a federal 
statute that defines and directly prohibits the offense of insider trading. 
Alternatively, in the absence of legislation by Congress, courts should 
supplement the classical and misappropriation theories, or replace them 
entirely, with other fraud-based theories of Rule 10b-5 liability. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II chronicles the development of 
fiduciary principles in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan. The analysis reveals that 
the Court’s affinity for fiduciary principles in insider trading cases originated 
as a means of confining the scope of liability under Rule 10b-5 to insiders 
who exploit the corporation’s information for their own personal profit. But 
after O’Hagan expanded the scope of Rule 10b-5 liability to include outsiders 
with no relationship to the corporation that had issued the securities, the 
Court’s slavish devotion to fiduciary principles no longer made much sense. 
Part III charts the gradual demise of fiduciary principles in insider 
trading decisions by lower federal courts, settled enforcement proceedings, 
and rules adopted by the SEC. It argues that this demise was inevitable given 
the shaky foundation on which the Supreme Court built its insider trading 
jurisprudence and the developing consensus that insider trading involves 
the wrongful use of confidential information regardless of whether a 
fiduciary-like duty is breached. While most securities litigation under Rule 
10b-5 involves a struggle to apply Supreme Court dictates to new sets of facts 
and circumstances, insider trading jurisprudence is unique in the liberties 
taken by lower courts and the SEC to simply ignore such dictates whenever 
their application would produce outcomes inconsistent with overarching 
policy objectives.25
Part IV offers specific suggestions to bring greater coherence and 
legitimacy to the law of insider trading. Recognizing that everything old can 
be new again, it begins by examining the proposed “Insider Trading 
Proscriptions Act of 1987,”
 
26 which would have amended the Exchange Act 
to prohibit the use of material nonpublic information to purchase or sell any 
security if a “person knows (or recklessly disregards) that such information 
has been obtained wrongfully, or if the purchase or sale would constitute a 
wrongful use of such information.”27
 
 25. For a more allegorical description of the liberties taken in insider trading cases, see 
Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1498 
(1999) (“[T]he SEC’s dysfunctional regulatory strategy brings to mind unpleasant images of 
Cinderella’s stepsisters who each chopped off portions of a foot in order to stuff the foot into 
Cinderella’s shoe.”). 
 The analysis highlights how closely the 
 26. The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987, S. 1380, 100th Cong. (1987) 
(reconciliation draft discussed at infra text accompanying notes 299–300). 
 27. Id. As we shall see, the statutory definition of “wrongful” extended to information that 
“has been obtained by, or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, (A) theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, espionage (through electronic or other means) or (B) conversion, 
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insider trading prohibition in this proposed statute aligns with the outcomes 
in recently litigated cases and settled proceedings as well as with the 
affirmative defenses and prohibitions now contained in the SEC’s insider 
trading rules. As second-choice alternatives for change, Part IV advances 
other theories of insider trading liability that could stand alongside of the 
classical and misappropriation theories endorsed by the Supreme Court. 
Specifically, courts could recognize an insider trading theory based on the 
deceptive acquisition of confidential information, or courts could recognize 
that insider trading constitutes a “fraud on investors” whenever improperly 
obtained material nonpublic information is used in a securities transaction. 
II. THE ESSENTIAL LINK BETWEEN FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES 
AND THE OFFENSE OF INSIDER TRADING 
In the United States, the law of insider trading is essentially judge-made. 
The critical role courts play is a function of the fact that no federal statute 
directly prohibits the offense of insider trading.28 Rather, insider trading 
may constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5, an SEC rule that broadly prohibits 
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.29
 
misappropriation, a breach of any fiduciary duty, any personal or other relationship of trust and 
confidence, or any contractual or employment relationship.” Id. 
 The lack of a 
 28. Although Congress has yet to enact a statute that directly prohibits insider trading, it 
has enacted stiff civil penalties for the offense. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange 
Act) § 21A, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2000) (authorizing the SEC to seek a monetary penalty of up to 
three times the profit gained or loss avoided through illegal insider trading and tipping); see also 
infra text accompanying notes 289–294 (discussing congressional authorization of civil penalties 
for insider trading). In addition, Congress addressed the topic of insider trading in Section 
16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), which provides that officers, directors, and 
shareholders holding more than ten percent of the stock in public companies may be liable to 
the corporation, or to shareholders suing on its behalf, for any profits they obtain from 
purchasing and selling the company’s stock within a six-month time frame. However, although 
a purpose of this “short-swing” profit provision was to prevent the unfair use of confidential 
corporate information, the provision applies regardless of whether the director, officer, or 
controlling shareholder was aware of material nonpublic information at the time of the short-
swing trade. DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES 
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 454–56 (2d ed. 2008). 
 29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). See supra note 5 for the text of Rule 10b-5. Insider 
trading in violation of Rule 10b-5 may be prosecuted by the SEC as a civil offense, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5, or may be criminally prosecuted by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under 
Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a), which authorizes fines of not more than 
$5 million and/or imprisonment for not more than twenty years for willful violations of 
Exchange Act provisions and rules. The DOJ may also pursue criminal prosecutions for insider 
trading under federal statutes prohibiting mail fraud or wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, or 
under a relatively new federal statute prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities of public companies, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745). 
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specific statutory prohibition means that insider trading is generally 
unlawful only to the extent that it constitutes deceptive conduct.30
To determine whether conduct is deceptive within the meaning of Rule 
10b-5, federal courts have looked to the common law of fraud and deceit.
 
31 
Under the common law, an individual committed fraud by intentionally 
misrepresenting a material fact on which another person relied to her 
detriment.32 Thus, the common law generally imposed liability for 
affirmative misstatements. Fraud by silence was actionable only in limited 
circumstances, and the default rule was one of caveat emptor.33
The challenge in prosecuting insider trading as a violation of Rule 10b-
5 thus turns on characterizing a defendant’s silence as a fraud.
 
34
 
 30. Insider trading prosecutions under Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3, constitute a 
notable exception. Promulgated by the SEC in 1980, pursuant to its rulemaking authority under 
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n, Rule 14e-3 functions as a special insider 
trading rule applying only in the context of a tender offer. Specifically, once “substantial steps” 
toward a tender offer have been taken, Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading by any person in possession 
of material nonpublic information relating to that tender offer when that person knows or has 
reason to know that the information is nonpublic and was received from the offeror, the target, 
or any person acting on behalf of either the offeror or the target. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3. 
Although Rule 14e-3 does not require any breach of fiduciary duty for liability to attach, the 
Supreme Court in O’Hagan upheld the validity of the rule, concluding that the SEC’s 
rulemaking authority pursuant to Section 14(e) was more expansive than its authority pursuant 
to Section 10(b). See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 672–73 (1997) (maintaining that 
Rule 14e-3 qualifies as a “means reasonably designed to prevent” fraud in connection with 
tender offers within the meaning of Section 14(e)). 
 Insider 
traders remain silent about the facts they know and others do not know—
typically secret good news or bad news about a corporation. Insider traders 
also remain silent when they obtain their informational advantage 
improperly, whether through the breach of an obligation to keep such 
information confidential or through outright theft or conversion. But for 
these silences to constitute deception in violation of Rule 10b-5, the insider 
trader must be under some type of obligation to speak. The classical and 
 31. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) (maintaining that implied 
private actions under Rule 10b-5 “resemble in many (but not all) respects common-law deceit 
and misrepresentation actions” (citations omitted)); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 U.S. 723, 744 (1975) (“[I]t is not inappropriate to advert briefly to the tort of 
misrepresentation and deceit, to which a claim under Rule 10b-5 certainly has some 
relationship.”). 
 32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (stating that in order to establish 
liability for fraud under tort law, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant “fraudulently 
[made] a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing [the 
plaintiff] to act . . . upon it . . . [causing] pecuniary loss . . . by his justifiable reliance upon the 
misrepresentation”). 
 33. See infra text accompanying notes 44–46. 
 34. See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 
26 GA. L. REV. 179, 183 (1991) (observing that the federal prohibition of insider trading “has 
been developed within the framework of federal securities fraud” and concluding that “the 
resulting case law contains logical as well as interpretive flaws”). 
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misappropriation theories of insider trading liability establish the 
circumstances under which such a disclosure duty arises, and, as we shall see, 
under either of the Supreme Court’s theories, the existence of a fiduciary-
like relationship is essential.35
A. THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF INSIDER TRADING 
 
The United States Supreme Court first considered Rule 10b-5’s 
applicability to the offense of insider trading in Chiarella v. United States.36 In 
that case, Vincent Chiarella, a financial printer hired by acquiring 
corporations to print takeover documents, used his ingenuity to decipher 
code names assigned to acquisition targets.37 Based on this confidential 
information, Chiarella purchased shares in the target companies, and when 
the tender offers were later announced to the public, he reaped substantial 
profits by selling those shares into the rising market.38
In prosecuting the indictment against Chiarella, the government 
argued that he had violated Rule 10b-5 by remaining silent about the secret 
good news that he used in his securities transaction with shareholders of the 
target companies.
 
39 Courts in the circuit where Chiarella’s trial took place 
had previously accepted this theory of “parity of access to information.”40 
That is, courts in the Second Circuit were of the view that “anyone in 
possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the 
investing public, or . . . must abstain from trading in or recommending the 
securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.”41 
A jury convicted Chiarella for his insider trading and sentenced him to jail.42
 
 35. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider 
Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1190 (1995) [hereinafter Bainbridge, 
Incorporating State Law] (stating that a person “violates the federal insider trading prohibition 
only if his trading activity breached a fiduciary duty owed either to the investor with whom he 
trades or to the source of the information” and thus the prohibition “has no force or substance 
until it has been filled with fiduciary duty concepts”); Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and 
the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982) [hereinafter 
Langevoort, Fiduciary Principle] (observing that “Chiarella has made the fiduciary principle a 
consideration of utmost importance”); Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec & Cynthia A. 
Williams, Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 
175 (1998) (recognizing that the “critical determination” under the misappropriation theory “is 
whether a fiduciary relationship exists creating a duty to disclose to the principal the fiduciary’s 
use of information”). 
 
 36. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Much of the following description of 
the classical and misappropriation theories, as well as the analysis of recent cases and rules, is 
based on the more extensive discussion in RALPH C. FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY & HERBERT 
THOMAS, FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL 2-25 to -28, 2-35 to -38 (2008). 
 37. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 226–27 
 40. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222. 
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The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella’s conviction, and in so doing, 
entrenched what has become known as the classical theory of insider 
trading. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell looked to the common law 
of fraud and deceit to determine whether Chiarella’s silence about material 
facts in a securities transaction violated Rule 10b-5.43
At common law, misrepresentation made for the purpose of 
inducing reliance upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one 
who fails to disclose material information prior to the 
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is 
under a duty to do so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has 
information “that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary 
or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.”
 Specifically, he stated 
that: 
44
The Court’s authority for the above statement was The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 551(2)(a).
 
45 That section delineated five independent exceptions to 
the general rule at common law that only affirmative misstatements could be 
actionable as fraud.46 As emphasized by Justices Blackmun and Marshall in 
their dissent, the final exception in the Restatement would have supported a 
disclosure duty “where one party’s superior knowledge of essential facts 
renders a transaction without disclosure inherently unfair.”47
 
 43. See id. at 228. 
 But Justice 
Powell ignored this exception as well as three of the others, focusing entirely 
 44. Id. at 228 (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) 
(1977)). 
 45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)–(e) (1977). 
 46. Id. The five exceptions provide that a knowledgeable party must disclose: 
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary 
or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them; and 
(b) matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent his partial or 
ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading; and 
(c) subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or 
misleading a previous representation that when made was true or believed to be so; 
and 
(d) the falsity of a representation not made with the expectation that it would be 
acted upon, if he subsequently learns that the other is about to act in reliance 
upon it in a transaction with him; and 
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it 
under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship 
between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would 
reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts. 
Id. 
 47. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar 
S. Gray, Misrepresentation—Part II, 37 MD. L. REV. 488, 526–27 (1978); 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 551(e) cmt l (1977)). 
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on the first exception, which rooted disclosure duties in fiduciary-like 
relationships such as “the relationship between a corporate insider and the 
stockholders of his corporation . . . .”48 Under this fiduciary framework, 
Chiarella’s silence in securities transactions with target shareholders could 
not be a fraud under Rule 10b-5 because “he was not a fiduciary, [and] he 
was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and 
confidence.”49 Justice Powell invoked the term “fiduciary” a total of seven 
times in Chiarella’s majority opinion.50
Chiarella’s fiduciary framework functioned as a means of retrenchment. 
That is, the Court developed a new theory of insider trading liability to 
replace the broader parity-of-access approach that lower courts and the SEC 
had embraced.
 
51 Because this new theory centered on the fiduciary 
relationship between insiders and shareholders, it narrowed substantially the 
categories of persons covered by Rule 10b-5’s prohibition. The theory 
therefore prevented what, at least in Justice Powell’s view, was overreaching 
on the part of government prosecutors.52 Yet, at the same time, the fiduciary 
framework allowed for the prosecution of traditional insiders who misused 
confidential information for their own personal profit.53 Although such 
trading by officers and directors emphatically was not before the Court, it 
was nonetheless a scenario that troubled Justice Powell greatly.54
 
 48. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227. 
 
 49. Id. at 232. 
 50. Id. at 227 n.8, 228 & n.10, 229, 230 n.12, 232 & n.14. The Chiarella majority also 
invoked the phrase “trust and confidence” four times. Id. at 228, 230, 232. 
 51. See Bainbridge, Path Dependent Choice, supra note 14, at 1599 (“Chiarella radically limited 
the scope of the insider trading prohibition as it had been defined in Texas Gulf Sulphur.”); 
Langevoort, Words from on High, supra note 19, at 872 (emphasizing that the new rule 
announced in Chiarella “clearly and deliberately cut back the reach of Rule 10b-5 as a general 
weapon against unfair information advantages”); A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: 
Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 15 (1998) 
[hereinafter Pritchard, Agency Law] (“Powell sought to restrain the government’s attack against 
insider trading by anchoring insider trading law to his interpretation of the common law of 
deceit.”). 
 52. See A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal 
Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L. J. 841, 933 (2003) [hereinafter Pritchard, Counterrevolution] (stating 
that “[a]s Powell saw it, courts had a responsibility to check such overreaching by the executive 
branch” and concluding that “Chiarella was a conscious attempt to bring precision and rigor to 
an area of the law in which the lower courts had strayed from Congress’s purposes”). 
 53. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (“Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading 
guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder’s welfare 
before their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic 
information.”). 
 54. Id.; see Pritchard, Counterrevolution, supra note 52, at 947 (“[Powell’s] distaste for the 
abuse of trust of insider trading led him to read the common law of fraud broadly in Chiarella to 
make room for a prohibition under section 10(b).”). 
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The next insider trading case to reach the Supreme Court was Dirks v. 
SEC,55 for which Justice Powell again wrote the majority opinion, this time 
referencing the term “fiduciary” a noteworthy thirty-three times.56 The 
question presented in Dirks was whether Raymond Dirks, a securities analyst 
who specialized in insurance companies, could be held liable under Rule 
10b-5 for “tipping” material nonpublic information about Equity Funding of 
America.57 The information, which was conveyed to Dirks by a former Equity 
Funding official, concerned a massive fraud that was occurring at the 
company.58 After verifying the information given to him by this 
whistleblower, Dirks shared his knowledge about the fraud with a number of 
his clients, who then avoided huge losses by promptly selling their Equity 
Funding stock.59 Like Chiarella, Dirks was not a fiduciary to the 
shareholders on the other side of his clients’ securities transactions. But the 
SEC sought to distinguish the facts of this case from Chiarella, arguing that a 
tippee “inherits [a disclosure] obligation to shareholders whenever he 
receives inside information from an insider.”60 Thus, in the SEC’s view, 
“anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an 
insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading.”61
The Court in Dirks once again rejected the SEC’s theory, maintaining 
that it conflicted with Chiarella’s principle “that only some persons, under 
some circumstances, will be barred from trading while in possession of 
material nonpublic information.”
 
62 The Court was concerned about the 
chilling effect from a broad prohibition, noting specifically “[the] inhibiting 
influence on the role of market analysts,” which “is necessary to the 
preservation of a healthy market.”63 But the Court was also quick to 
recognize the “need for a ban on some tippee trading.”64
 
 55. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 As the Court saw 
it: 
 56. Id. at 652, 653, 654, 655 & n.14, 656 & n.15, 659, 660 & n.20, 661, 662 & n.22, 663 
n.23, 664, 665 & n.26, 667 & n.27. The Court also made reference to a relationship of “trust and 
confidence”: 
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be no duty to disclose where 
the person who has traded on inside information “was not [the corporation’s] 
agent, . . . was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the 
securities] had placed their trust and confidence.” 
Id. at 654 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232). 
 57. Id. at 648–51. 
 58. Id. at 649. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655–56. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 657. 
 63. Id. at 658. 
 64. Id. at 659. 
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Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from 
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their 
advantage, but they also may not give such information to an 
outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the 
information for their personal gain. Similarly, the transactions of 
those who knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach 
are “as forbidden” as transactions “on behalf of the trustee 
himself.” . . . [A] contrary rule “would open up opportunities for 
devious dealings in the name of others that the trustee could not 
conduct in his own.”65
Thus, in Justice Powell’s view, insiders of a corporation should not be able to 
funnel information to persons outside the corporation with the purpose of 
exploiting that information for personal profit.
 
66
Having used policy considerations to justify the need for a ban on some 
tippee trading, the Court then faced the daunting task of delineating the 
circumstances under which a tippee’s silence about material facts in 
securities transactions could be deemed a fraud actionable under Rule 10b-
5. Unwilling to unmoor the disclosure duty from the fiduciary framework he 
constructed in Chiarella, Justice Powell emphasized that the tippee’s 
disclosure duty (if any) must be “derivative from that of the insider’s duty.”
 
67
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a 
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only 
when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the 
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.
 
That is: 
68
Thus, as Professor Donald Langevoort has observed, it is the tipper and the 
tippee’s co-participation in the insider’s breach of duty that serves to 
“fiduciarize” the tippee.
 
69
Yet the Court also recognized that not all disclosures of confidential 
corporate information violate the duty that an insider owes to shareholders. 
In the Court’s view, only improper disclosures constitute a breach of 
fiduciary duty, and thus, only improper disclosures would operate to 
“fiduciarize” the tippee.
 
70
 
 65. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (quoting Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271–72 (1951)). 
 More specifically, because “a purpose of the 
securities laws was to eliminate the ‘use of inside information for personal 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 659. 
 68. Id. at 660. 
 69. Donald C. Langevoort, The Demise of Dirks: Shifting Standards for Tipper-Tippee Liability, 8 
No. 6 INSIGHTS 23, 24 (1994) [hereinafter Langevoort, The Demise of Dirks]. 
 70. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. 
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advantage,’”71 the Court maintained that liability for Rule 10b-5 should turn 
on the tipper’s motive for disclosing the confidential information.72 The 
test, according to the Court, involves “whether the insider personally will 
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal 
gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach 
by the insider, there is no derivative breach.”73 This “personal benefit” 
requirement sharply distinguished a fiduciary’s breach of the duty of loyalty 
(which would trigger Rule 10b-5 liability) from a breach of a fiduciary’s duty 
of care (which would not result in a Rule 10b-5 violation).74 The Court, 
however, made clear that courts should broadly construe the requirement of 
a personal benefit for tipper–tippee liability, and cited examples, such as a 
“relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro 
quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient” and 
“when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading 
relative or friend.”75
But Dirks himself did not become privy to the confidential information 
about Equity Funding as the result of an insider’s improper breach of the 
duty of loyalty. The former executive shared the information with Dirks as a 
means of exposing the company’s fraud; he was not looking to make a gift of 
that information nor was the executive seeking a personal benefit.
 
76 
Accordingly, Dirks could not be held liable under Rule 10b-5 for 
“participating after the fact” in a nonexistent breach.77
Because the classical theory premises Rule 10b-5 liability on a fiduciary’s 
deceptive silence in securities transactions with a corporation’s shareholders, 
it left a wide gap in the law of insider trading. To be sure, the theory 
triggered liability when an officer or director traded in the corporation’s 
securities while aware of material nonpublic information or tipped others to 
trade. The Supreme Court also viewed the theory as flexible enough to 
extend liability to trading by employees and temporary agents of the 
corporation who, while not technically fiduciaries, were nonetheless viewed 
as owing a fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence to the corporation’s 
 
 
 71. Id. at 662 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)). 
 72. Id. at 664. 
 73. Id. at 662. 
 74. See Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law, supra note 35, at 1195 (emphasizing that 
“[w]hat is proscribed in not merely a breach of confidentiality by the insider, but rather a 
breach of the duty of loyalty imposed on all fiduciaries to avoid personally profiting from 
information entrusted to them”); Pritchard, Counterrevolution, supra note 52, at 942 (stating that 
under Powell’s reasoning, “[g]arden variety breaches of the duty of care were clearly out; 
tipping required a breach of the duty of loyalty”). 
 75. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (emphasis omitted). 
 76. Id. at 667. 
 77. Id. 
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shareholders.78
B. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY 
 But the classical theory allowed persons outside the issuing 
corporation to trade with impunity, even though such persons may have 
gained their knowledge through unlawful means. By virtue of their 
“outsider” status, persons unconnected to the issuing corporation lacked the 
fiduciary nexus that was necessary to render their silence a fraud actionable 
under Rule 10b-5. 
In the 1997 case of United States v. O’Hagan,79 the Supreme Court 
endorsed an alternative theory of insider trading under Rule 10b-5, based 
once again on a fiduciary principle. Labeled the “misappropriation theory,” 
this theory had its judicial roots in Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in 
Chiarella.80 While agreeing with Justice Powell’s view that any duty of 
disclosure owed to marketplace traders must arise from a fiduciary 
relationship, Justice Stevens maintained that “[r]espectable arguments could 
be made” that Chiarella had violated Rule 10b-5 by breaching a duty of 
silence “he unquestionably owed to his employer and to his employer’s 
customers.”81 That is, by purchasing stock in the target companies, Chiarella 
arguably defrauded the acquiring companies that had entrusted his 
employer with the confidential tender offer information. Justice Stevens 
noted, however, that the majority “wisely” left the validity of this fraud-on-
the-source theory “for another day” because it was not presented to the jury, 
and thus, did not form the basis of Chiarella’s conviction.82
Other Justices on the Chiarella Court had expressed a willingness to 
support an even broader version of a misappropriation theory that would 
have applied even in the absence of a fiduciary relationship between the 
trader and the information’s source. The principal proponent of this 
broader theory was Chief Justice Burger. He argued that while silence about 
material facts in business transactions is generally permissible absent a 
fiduciary relationship between the parties, that general rule “should give way 
when an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, 
foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means.”
 
83 Thus, as the Chief 
Justice saw it, Chiarella’s silence about facts pertaining to the planned 
tender offers constituted a fraud on the investors with whom he was 
trading.84
 
 78. Id. at 655 n.14 (“Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is 
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the 
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders.”). 
 In other words, Chiarella owed a disclosure duty to marketplace 
 79. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 80. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 238 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. at 245. 
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traders by virtue of the fact that he “misappropriated—stole, to put it 
bluntly—valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost 
confidence.”85
Although Chief Justice Burger’s “fraud on investors” approach was the 
broader misappropriation theory, it was Justice Stevens’s “fraud on the 
source” version that commanded acceptance in the lower courts, first from 
the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman
 
86 and then from several other 
circuits.87 But the lower courts’ embrace of the “fraud on the source” version 
was largely a function of the government’s litigation strategy. That is, as one 
scholar explains, the government deliberately did not pursue the “fraud on 
investors” theory in Newman because “[i]t was considered too confusing to 
present to the jury in tandem with the fraud on the source theory.”88 The 
government employed a similar strategy in United States v. O’Hagan in its 
briefs and oral argument before the Court, framing the insider trading issue 
solely as a fraud on the source.89
The facts of O’Hagan involved securities trading by James O’Hagan, a 
former partner at Dorsey & Whitney, a large Minneapolis law firm.
 
90
 
 85. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245. Interestingly, in its brief to the Supreme Court in Chiarella, 
the government argued that Chiarella’s securities trading based on misappropriated 
information defrauded both the source of the information and the shareholders on the other 
side of his transactions. Brief of Respondent United States at 24, 28, 38–39, Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1979) (No. 78-1202), 1979 WL 199454. 
 
O’Hagan learned that a law-firm client, Grand Metropolitan (“Grand Met”), 
 86. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). In United States v. Carpenter, 791 
F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1986), the Second Circuit applied the misappropriation theory in a 
case involving a Wall Street Journal reporter and his tippee, who had traded securities on the 
basis of information that would be appearing in the reporter’s upcoming “Heard on the Street” 
columns. The court found the defendants guilty of violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as 
well as the federal-mail and wire-fraud statutes. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1025–26. The Supreme 
Court unanimously affirmed the defendants’ convictions for mail and wire fraud but was 
equally divided (4–4) on the validity of the misappropriation theory and thus affirmed the 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 convictions without opinion. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 
19, 24 (1987). 
 87. Prior to the Court’s decision in O’Hagan, the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits had 
joined the Second Circuit in endorsing the misappropriation theory. See, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 
F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 1990); Rothberg v. 
Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 823 (3d Cir. 1985). The misappropriation theory was rejected by the 
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995), and by the Eighth 
Circuit in United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 614, 620 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 642 
(1997). 
 88. Langevoort, Words from on High, supra note 19, at 883. 
 89. The “fraud on investors” theory was, however, advanced in an amicus brief. Brief for 
North American Securities Administrators Ass’n, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 11–14, United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842), 1997 WL 
86236 (“Chief Justice Burger’s disclosure-based misappropriation theory of liability is a sound 
and sensible application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and it satisfies the statutory 
requirements of deception and a connection to the purchase or sale of securities.”). 
 90. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642. 
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was planning a hostile tender offer for shares of Pillsbury Corporation.91 In 
desperate need of money to cover his prior thefts of client funds from trust 
accounts, O’Hagan purchased call options for Pillsbury stock as well as 
shares of common stock.92 He later realized a profit of $4.3 million when he 
exercised those options and sold his shares in Pillsbury upon Grand Met’s 
tender-offer announcement.93 A jury convicted O’Hagan of multiple 
offenses, including insider trading under Rule 10b-5, and sentenced him to 
forty-one months of imprisonment.94 The Eighth Circuit, however, 
overturned that conviction, holding that Rule 10b-5 liability may not be 
grounded on a misappropriation theory of securities fraud.95 The Supreme 
Court disagreed and reversed the Eighth Circuit’s decision.96
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion endorsed a misappropriation theory 
that was “limited to those who breach a recognized duty.”
 
97 The opinion’s 
discussion of the misappropriation theory referenced the term “fiduciary” 
seventeen times98 and drew substantially from the common law of agency.99 
At the outset, the Court stated that “[t]he ‘misappropriation theory’ holds 
that a person commits fraud ‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, 
and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates 
confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty 
owed to the source of the information.”100
 
 91. Id. 
 Drawing a distinction between 
this theory and the classical theory, the Court maintained that: “[i]n lieu of 
 92. Id. at 648 (referencing the charge in the indictment that “O’Hagan used the profits he 
gained through this trading to conceal his previous embezzlement and conversion of unrelated 
client trust funds”); see also id. at 649 n.2 (“O’Hagan was convicted of theft in state court, 
sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, and fined.”). 
 93. Id. at 642. 
 94. Id. at 649. 
 95. United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 620 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 96. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 678. 
 97. Id. at 666. 
 98. Id. at 647, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 661, 663, 667, 669, 670, 671, 673 n.17, 675, 676. In 
discussing the misappropriation theory, the Court also referenced the phrase “trust and 
confidence” five times. Id. at 652, 653, 662, 670. 
 99. See id. at 654–55 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 390, 395 (1958) 
(discussing an agent’s disclosure obligation regarding use of confidential information)); see also 
Pritchard, Agency Law, supra note 51, at 15 (emphasizing that the “Court’s decision in O’Hagan 
breaks new ground in establishing a foundation for insider trading based on common-law 
agency principles”). At one point in the opinion, the Court indirectly referenced the violation 
of a “contractual” obligation. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 663 (“misappropriation theory bars only 
‘trading on the basis of information that the wrongdoer converted to his own use in violation of 
some fiduciary, contractual, or similar obligation to the owner or rightful possessor of the 
information’” (quoting Barbara B. Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for 
Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 122 (1984))). Used in that context, 
the term “contractual” obligation appears to describe an obligation that creates fiduciary-like 
duties of trust and confidence, such as those that would flow from an agency relationship. 
 100. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
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premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and 
purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the misappropriation theory 
premises liability on a fiduciary-turned trader’s deception of those who 
entrusted him with access to confidential information.”101 Thus, as the 
Court saw it, “a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s 
information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and 
confidentiality,” violates Rule 10b-5 because such trading “defrauds the 
principal of the exclusive use of that information.”102 The Court clearly 
credited the government with framing the theory it was endorsing.103 
Indeed, as one scholar noted, “[i]n resolving the case, the majority did 
essentially what the government told it to do.”104
Having provided at the outset a ringing endorsement to the “fraud on 
the source” misappropriation theory, Justice Ginsburg then justified that 
holding by elaborating on the textual requirements for liability under 
Section 10(b). Focusing first on the textual element of “deception,” the 
Court emphasized that misappropriators “deal in deception.”
 
105 Specifically, 
a “fiduciary who ‘[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting 
the principal’s information for personal gain’ dupes or defrauds the 
principal.”106
Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory 
involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the 
fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the 
nonpublic information, there is no “deceptive device” and thus no 
§ 10(b) violation—although the fiduciary-turned-trader may 
remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty.
 Yet, the Court also recognized that full disclosure by the 
fiduciary to the principal would negate this essential element: 
107
Turning next to the textual requirement that the defendant’s deception 
must be “in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security,” the Court 
reasoned that this element was satisfied because: 
 
 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
 103. See, e.g., id. at 655 n.6 (“Under the misappropriation theory urged in this case, the 
disclosure obligation runs to the source of the information, here, Dorsey & Whitney and Grand 
Met.” (emphasis added)); id. at 654 (“Deception through nondisclosure [to the source of the 
information] is central to the theory of liability for which the Government seeks recognition.” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 655 (reconciling “[t]he misappropriation theory advanced by the 
Government” with Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (emphasis added)). 
 104. Bainbridge, Path Dependent Choice, supra note 14, at 1638 (observing that “the 
misappropriation section of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion repeatedly quoted from or cited to the 
government’s brief and oral argument, almost always approvingly”). 
 105. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653. 
 106. Id. at 653–54 (quoting Brief for the Petitioner, O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-
842), 1997 WL 86306). 
 107. Id. at 655. 
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[T]he fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary 
gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to 
his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities. 
The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide. 
This is so even though the person or entity defrauded is not the 
other party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic 
information.108
Under this reasoning, the Court had little trouble concluding that 
O’Hagan’s purchases of stock in Pillsbury on the basis of his law firm’s and 
its client’s confidential information constituted deceptive conduct “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security.”
 
109
In addition to its arguments based on the text of the statute, the Court 
in O’Hagan also bolstered the misappropriation theory with considerations 
of policy. Early on in the opinion, the Court emphasized that the 
misappropriation theory was designed to “protec[t] the integrity of the 
securities markets against abuses by ‘outsiders’ to a corporation who have 
access to confidential information that will affect th[e] corporation’s 
security price when revealed.”
 
110 The Court also linked the 
misappropriation theory to the policy goal of enhancing investor 
confidence, reasoning that while “informational disparity is inevitable in the 
securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a 
market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is 
unchecked by law.”111
Although the misappropriation theory endorsed in O’Hagan extended 
Rule 10b-5 liability to a host of scenarios involving “outsiders” to the 
corporation in which the securities were traded, its “deception by a 
fiduciary” paradigm failed to capture all instances of trading on 
misappropriated information. For example, as the government 
acknowledged in oral argument, the misappropriation theory would not 
extend to securities trading by a stranger who had stolen confidential 
information from its source.
 
112
 
 108. Id. at 656. 
 Moreover, as the Court itself recognized, 
 109. Id. at 643, 659. 
 110. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (citing Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 106, at 14). 
 111. Id. at 658. 
 112. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1998) (No. 96-842), 1997 
WL 182584. The transcript reads: 
MR. DREEBEN: The misappropriation theory . . . involves . . . an agent entrusted 
with information by a principal under the understanding between the parties that 
the agent would not use that information for any personal gain without obtaining 
the principal’s agreement. 
QUESTION: Well, Mr. Dreeben, then if someone stole the lawyer’s briefcase and 
discovered the information and traded on it, no violation? 
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even fiduciaries could escape Rule 10b-5 liability if they brazenly shared with 
their principal their intention to trade.113
Unfortunately, the Court in O’Hagan never came to terms with why its 
misappropriation theory “was limited to those who breached a recognized 
duty” and why “feigning fidelity” to the information’s source was essential. 
To be sure, the Court included a footnote referencing Chief Justice Burger’s 
alternative theory of liability, which viewed the act of trading on 
misappropriated information as a “fraud on investors.”
 
114 Because this 
theory focused on the use of unlawfully obtained information, it would have 
extended liability to securities trading by non-fiduciary thieves and to 
fiduciaries who trade with disclosure to, but without permission from, the 
source. But in referencing the Burger approach, the Court commented only 
that “[t]he Government does not propose that we adopt a misappropriation 
theory of that breadth.”115 The sentiment behind this cryptic statement is 
difficult to understand. Congress essentially codified Chief Justice Burger’s 
“fraud on investors” approach in Section 20A of the Exchange Act,116 which 
grants an express private right of action to those investors trading 
contemporaneously with an insider trader.117
 
MR. DREEBEN: That’s correct, Justice O’Connor. 
 Moreover, any concern the 
Court raised about expansive private liability would have been unwarranted, 
since insider trading cases are typically brought by the government—the 
Id. 
 113. See supra text accompanying note 107; see also Painter et al., supra note 35, at 180 
(emphasizing that “a fiduciary is permitted to trade even without the principal’s consent so long 
as disclosure is made to the principal first”). 
 114. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 n.6 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 
(1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2000). 
 117. See Langevoort, Words from on High, supra note 19, at 883 (discussing Chief Justice 
Burger’s dissenting opinion in Chiarella). Section 20A’s legislative history reveals that Congress 
intended the express private right of action for contemporaneous traders specifically to 
“overturn court cases which have precluded recovery for plaintiffs where the defendant’s 
violation is premised upon the misappropriation theory.” H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 
INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 
26–27 (2d Sess. 1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6063 [hereinafter ITSFEA HOUSE 
REPORT]. The Report’s reference to “court cases” was directed at Moss v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 
719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983), where the Second Circuit refused to hold the defendants liable 
for insider trading because, although they breached a duty owed to the source of the 
information (their investment-bank employer), the defendants “owed no duty of disclosure to” 
the private plaintiffs. Moss, 719 F.2d at 16. Section 20A thus reflects an explicit congressional 
repudiation of Moss’s concern that liability to contemporaneous traders in misappropriation 
cases would grant “a windfall recovery simply to discourage tortious conduct by securities 
purchasers.” Id. 
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SEC in civil actions or the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in criminal cases—
rather than by private plaintiffs.118
The O’Hagan Court’s affinity for a fiduciary framework also fails to 
make sense as a matter of policy. As we have seen in Chiarella, Justice Powell 
used the fiduciary principle to circumscribe the class of defendants subject 
to Rule 10b-5 liability.
 
119 Chiarella’s fiduciary principle was thus inextricably 
tied to its policy goal of preventing insiders from exploiting the 
corporation’s information for personal profit. O’Hagan then widened the 
class of insider trading defendants to include certain outsiders who misuse 
confidential information in securities transactions. But the Court failed to 
provide a convincing rationale as to why that circle should be limited to 
those outsiders with a fiduciary-like nexus to the source. Given its concern 
with investor confidence and market integrity, the Court should have 
employed a broader theory that captured insider trading by non-fiduciary 
thieves and fiduciaries who disclose their intention to trade. Indeed, insider 
trading in those instances undermines market integrity and investor 
confidence to the same extent as secret trading by a fiduciary.120
The “deception by a fiduciary” paradigm did, however, provide a well-
recognized route for reinstating O’Hagan’s conviction under Rule 10b-5. It 
also allowed the Court to complement its prior decisions by adhering to 
Chiarella and Dirks’s fiduciary rhetoric. In short, neither the government nor 
the Court needed another route in O’Hagan for sustaining liability. And 
because other routes were unnecessary, they were left unexplored. 
 The Court 
would have served O’Hagan’s policy goals far better had it not endorsed a 
theory predicated entirely on a fiduciary relationship between the source 
and the trader. 
III. THE CASTING ASIDE OF FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES 
This Part of the Article explores how and why courts and the SEC often 
cast aside the fiduciary principles established in Chiarella, Dirks, and 
O’Hagan. Part A begins by examining the Supreme Court’s own willingness 
to depart from fiduciary principles in constructing both the classical and 
 
 118. Although contemporaneous traders have an express right of action against persons 
who violate the federal securities laws by insider trading (or tipping), actions based solely on 
Section 20A are relatively infrequent, in part due to the narrow interpretation accorded the 
term “contemporaneous,” see NAGY, ET AL., supra note 28, at 522, and in part because Section 
20A’s statutory remedy is limited to the insider trader’s profit or loss, which is further offset by 
any amount recovered by the SEC in disgorgement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(b). Enforcement of 
the federal prohibition of insider trading thus falls largely upon the government. But see NAGY, 
ET AL., supra note 28, at 131 (discussing Rule 10b-5’s heightened requirements for pleading 
scienter and noting that many actions against corporations for fraudulent misstatements or 
omissions also allege insider trading by company officials as a means of establishing a motive for 
the fraud). 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 51–53 
 120. See Nagy, supra note 23, at 1251–65. 
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misappropriation theories of insider trading. Part B then focuses on recent 
insider trading decisions where adherence to the “deception by a fiduciary” 
paradigm would have produced rulings precisely opposite to those reached 
by the courts. The final Part analyzes SEC rulemaking in the insider trading 
area. It first examines Rule 10b5-1, an SEC rule that abandons fiduciary 
principles in instances where officers and directors have traded securities 
pursuant to pre-existing trading plans. It then turns to Rule 10b5-2, which 
extends the misappropriation theory beyond the context of a fiduciary’s self-
serving use of material nonpublic information. A theme common to all 
three of these Parts is that insider trading involves the wrongful use of 
confidential information and Rule 10b-5 should be construed to prohibit 
such misuse. Although a majority of the Supreme Court has yet to endorse a 
doctrine expansive enough to reflect this view, a host of lower courts and the 
SEC have in effect concluded that the offense of insider trading focuses on a 
person’s wrongful use of confidential information, regardless of whether a 
fiduciary-like duty is breached. 
A. THE SUPREME COURT’S FIDUCIARY FICTIONS 
From a doctrinal perspective, the Court’s fiduciary foundation for 
insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5 was shaky from the start. At 
common law, most jurisdictions did not recognize the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship between an officer or director and the shareholders of 
a corporation. Rather, the majority of jurisdictions recognized that officers 
and directors owed fiduciary duties only to the corporation and not to its 
shareholders as such.121 Thus, Chiarella’s statement about the fiduciary basis 
of the insider–shareholder relationship was drawn from the so-called 
“minority rule.”122 And even those minority jurisdictions would not have 
extended the term fiduciary to mere employees or temporary agents of the 
corporations.123
 
 121. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 939–43 
(2004) (contrasting the so-called “majority rule”—which permitted traditional insiders to 
remain silent about material facts in transactions with shareholders on the theory that they 
owed fiduciary duties only to the corporation but not to the individual shareholder—with the 
so-called “special circumstances” doctrine—which recognized a duty to disclose when one party 
to a transaction had access to highly significant facts that were unknown to the other party—
and the so-called minority rule—which recognized a fiduciary relationship between traditional 
insiders and the corporation’s shareholders and imposed disclosure duties on traditional 
insiders by virtue of their status). 
 
 122. See infra note 217 (citing common-law “minority rule” decisions imposing disclosure 
duties on officers and directors in face-to-face transactions with shareholders of the 
corporation). 
 123. See Fisch, supra note 34, at 193 (“Particularly in older cases, the position of a corporate 
insider has been analogized to that of a trustee” and observing that the law of trusts “imposes 
upon the trustee a duty of ‘utmost fairness’ to the beneficiary, including disclosure of all 
information known to the trustee”). 
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Minority jurisdictions placed two additional limitations on a 
shareholder’s ability to prove deceit in a securities transaction with an 
insider. First, an insider’s silence about material facts could be rendered 
fraudulent only in the context of a face-to-face transaction.124 As noted 
previously, a plaintiff’s detrimental reliance was essential for the court to 
find deceit. However, in securities transactions over a stock exchange, buyers 
and sellers generally remain anonymous to each other. Thus, a shareholder 
could not establish that he or she had relied on the insider’s silence.125 Yet 
the Chiarella Court cited numerous face-to-face transaction cases in support 
of a classical theory that was intended to apply to all securities trading, 
including anonymous market transactions.126 Second, minority jurisdictions 
made clear that insiders owed fiduciary duties only to those investors with 
pre-existing relationships to the corporation.127 Chiarella maintained, 
however, that it would be a “sorry distinction” to recognize fiduciary duties 
between a shareholder and an insider but not to recognize such duties in 
the very transaction where the person became a shareholder.128 As Professor 
Victor Brudney observed, it is more than a little ironic “that the Supreme 
Court, in its efforts to narrow the scope of the disclosure requirements of 
Section 10(b), assumed, and in some sense may have furthered, broad local 
fiduciary law disclosure obligations of management and controllers.”129
Fiduciary fiction was also essential to the Court’s decision in Dirks, 
which recognized that tippees can, in some circumstances, inherit an 
insider’s duty of disclosure.
 
130
 
 124. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (Mass. 1933) (refusing to recognize the 
breach of a disclosure duty when the traditional insider’s securities transactions were carried 
out over an anonymous stock exchange); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch 
Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1153 n.296 (1996) 
(“Research has not disclosed any case in which a stockholder selling in the market has 
successfully invoked [a] fiduciary disclosure duty, as opposed to Rule 10b-5, to recover 
compensatory damages from a director who concurrently bought stock.”). 
 To be sure, common-law courts may have 
barred a co-conspirator from profiting from the breach of an insider’s duty 
to the corporation. But it is more than a stretch to say that this equitable 
 125. See Pritchard, Agency Law, supra note 51, at 25 (“Because of this anonymity in exchange 
markets, there can be no reliance on the insider's duty to disclose, and the insider cannot be 
said to have induced the trade.”). 
 126. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229–30 (1980) (citing Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 146 (1972)(face-to-face transaction involving fiduciary 
bank employees who purchased stock from their beneficiaries) and Speed v. Transamerica 
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951) (face-to-face transaction involving majority 
shareholder and minority shareholder)). 
 127. See Pritchard, Agency Law, supra note 51, at 26 (noting that “the fiduciary obligation of 
corporate officers and directors . . . does not extend to prospective shareholders who may 
purchase their shares for the first time when an insider sells”). 
 128. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 n.8 (quoting Judge Learned Hand’s statement in Gratz v. 
Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951)). 
 129. Victor Brudney, O’Hagan’s Problems, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 255 n.15 (1997). 
 130. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 647, 655 (1983). 
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principle spawns a fiduciary duty of disclosure on the part of a tippee that 
would render his silence a fraud.131 Even more difficult to justify under the 
common law is the notion that other tippees in a chain of communication 
function as fiduciaries whose silence is deceptive to shareholders.132
Although fiduciary fictions were less central to the Court’s analysis in 
O’Hagan, the Court nonetheless painted fiduciary principles with an 
extremely broad brush. The critical determination in a misappropriation 
case is the presence of a fiduciary-like relationship that triggers a duty to 
disclose to the principal the fiduciary’s self-serving use of the confidential 
information. Yet, other than emphasizing the hallmarks of trust, loyalty, and 
confidentiality, the Court provided little analysis concerning fiduciary 
parameters.
 Unlike 
an initial tippee who may have had direct contact with the insider–fiduciary, 
remote tippees are not only strangers to the corporation’s shareholders, they 
are often strangers to the insider as well. 
133 In addition, O’Hagan’s creation of a safe harbor for 
fiduciaries who brazenly disclose to their principals their intention to trade 
makes little sense as a matter of fiduciary law.134 As the Court itself 
recognized, absent permission, a fiduciary’s use of the principal’s 
information constitutes a clear violation of the duty of loyalty.135
Taken together, Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan evidence a Supreme 
Court willing to stretch fiduciary principles to no small degree, when doing 
 However, 
because the text of Section 10(b) extends only to conduct that is deceptive 
or manipulative, under Justice Ginsburg’s framework, full disclosure by the 
fiduciary to the source of the information must necessarily foreclose Rule 
10b-5 liability. 
 
 131. See Fisch, supra note 34, at 210 (contending that “if the insider tips in breach of a duty 
of nondisclosure, it is illogical to find that this duty of nondisclosure is converted, in the hands of 
the tippee, into a duty to disclose”). 
 132. See Langevoort, The Demise of Dirks, supra note 69, at 24 (stating that it “is hard to see 
how a person who happens to be an unintended recipient of information becomes a participant 
with the original insider simply by the virtue of the receipt of that information”); see also 
Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV 181, 184 (2006) (contending 
that “the treatment of remote tippees tends to highlight the often disingenuous rationales 
underlying current regulation of insider trading”). 
 133. See Painter et al., supra note 35, at 191 (bemoaning that the misappropriation theory 
requires federal courts to embroil themselves in debates over the fiduciary duties of 
“accountants, appraisers, and investment bankers to their clients; doctors to their patients; taxi 
and limousine drivers to their passengers; newspaper columnists to their employers and their 
readers; professors to their students who work for law firms; priests, ministers, and rabbis to 
their parishioners; and so on”). 
 134. See Joseph McLaughlin, O’Hagan: Some Answers, More Questions, N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1997, at 
1 (characterizing O’Hagan’s “disclosure to the source” exception as a “foul ball” in an otherwise 
“home run” decision and stating that “the damage [it] cause[s] will not be known for some 
time”); Painter et al., supra note 35, at 180 (noting in their aptly entitled article that “[o]nce the 
intent to trade is disclosed to the principal, the trading is legal under Section 10(b), no matter 
how strenuously the principal objects”). 
 135. See supra text accompanying note 107. 
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so facilitates a desirable policy outcome. But the Court’s methodology may 
well have emboldened lower courts to approach new issues with similar 
results-oriented reasoning. 
B. LOWER COURTS AND THEIR DISREGARD OF THE 
“DECEPTION BY A FIDUCIARY” PARADIGM 
Although several lower courts have adhered strictly to the Supreme 
Court’s dictate that insider trading liability must be predicated on deception 
by a fiduciary,136
1. Liability for the Non-Fiduciary Thief 
 a growing number of courts simply disregard this fiduciary 
dictate when it forecloses liability against a defendant who has traded 
securities based on wrongfully obtained information. The first three Parts 
below explore decisions exemplifying this disregard. The final Part examines 
two insider trading decisions that ignored fiduciary principles in instances 
where their application would have established a violation of Rule 10b-5. 
My initial critique of the O’Hagan decision predicted that an insider 
trading jurisprudence grounded in “deception by a fiduciary” would 
frustrate the government’s ability to prosecute a wide range of insider 
trading cases.137 I argued in particular that O’Hagan’s “recognized duty” 
requirement would create an unfortunate obstacle in cases involving the 
misappropriation of confidential information by a non-fiduciary.138 One of 
the scenarios I envisioned involved a computer hacker who had purchased 
securities based on confidential information obtained through illegally 
accessing an issuer’s database.139
 
 136. For examples of post-O’Hagan decisions dismissing insider trading charges based on 
the government’s failure to establish a preexisting fiduciary relationship between the defendant 
and the source of the information or the issuer of the securities, see infra text accompanying 
notes 
 As a complete stranger to the source of the 
153–155 (discussing SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 07 Civ. 9606, 2008 WL 126612 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 
2008)); see also infra text accompanying notes 249–256 (discussing United States v. Kim, 184 F. 
Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2002)). The decision in United States v. Cassese, 273 F. Supp. 2d 481, 
485 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), likewise reflects a strict adherence to the Supreme Court’s fiduciary 
dictate. The court in Cassese refused to find a fiduciary-like relationship where, in the course of 
negotiations for a possible business combination, one company official had disclosed 
confidential information about a pending acquisition to an official from another company who 
then traded on that information. Id. at 488. The court emphasized that the company officials 
were “not inherent fiduciaries, but rather potential arms-length business partners . . . [who did 
not have] a long-standing relationship or . . . regularly share[] confidences.” Id. at 486; see also 
SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (granting summary judgment to the 
defendant because the SEC could not show he owed a fiduciary duty to the “originating source” 
of the information on which he traded), rev’d, 530 F.3d 1085, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(reversing the district court because the defendant’s breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the 
“immediate source” of the information was sufficient to establish his liability under the 
misappropriation theory). 
 137. See Nagy, supra note 23, at 1251–64. 
 138. Id. at 1251–56. 
 139. Id. at 1253. 
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information, a computer hacker could not be said to have been entrusted 
with confidential information. Thus, because the deception essential to the 
misappropriation theory involved “feigning fidelity” to the source of the 
information, I concluded that O’Hagan would not extend to computer 
hacking or similar cases involving securities trading based on information 
misappropriated by a non-fiduciary.140 Several other securities scholars have 
reached the same conclusion.141
In the decade since O’Hagan, the SEC has brought three insider trading 
cases charging computer hackers with violations of Rule 10b-5.
 
142 The SEC 
also initiated an enforcement action against what can be termed a 
cybersnoop: a defendant who had correctly guessed the password to a 
relative’s home computer and then used confidential information stored on 
the computer to purchase securities in a company targeted for an 
acquisition.143
The SEC’s three computer-hacker cases involved remarkably similar 
facts. In each complaint, the SEC alleged that the defendants—all foreign 
nationals living abroad—had used phony passwords and other means of 
high-tech trickery to gain access to computer databases that stored 
confidential market-moving information about the securities issuers.
 Although litigation remains pending in one of the cases, the 
penalties and equitable remedies imposed in the others would not have 
been possible absent the demise of fiduciary principles. 
144 In 
one of the cases, the complaint further alleged that the defendants had used 
false identities and paperwork to open brokerage accounts in the United 
States.145
 
 140. Id. 
 Thus, in the SEC’s view, the defendants’ deceptive conduct in 
 141. See Painter et al., supra note 35, at 181 (noting the government’s concession in 
O’Hagan’s oral argument that the misappropriation theory would not extend to trading by a 
thief); Robert A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challenges for the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 
12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 297–98 (1999) (contending that absent acceptance of 
“nontraditional” arguments, insider trading based on hacked information “would have to be 
punished . . . via mail fraud, wire fraud, simple theft, or other comparable statutes”); Joel 
Seligman, A Mature Synthesis: O’Hagan Resolves “Insider” Trading’s Most Vexing Problems, 23 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1, 22 (1998) (stating that “an old fashioned burglar apparently need not fear Rule 10b-
5” because “[h]e or she clearly violates the criminal law, but not a fiduciary or similar duty”). 
But see Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 594 (2008) (“O’Hagan and its 
progeny should not be read as requiring a fiduciary relationship under the misappropriation 
theory.”). 
 142. SEC v. Dorozhko, Litigation Release No. 20,349, 91 SEC Docket 2514 (Oct. 30, 2007), 
available at 2007 WL 3168187; SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd. & Stokes (Blue Bottle Lit. Rel. I), Litigation 
Release No. 20,018, 2007 WL 580798 (Feb. 26, 2007); SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann 
(Lohmus Lit. Rel. I), Litigation Release No. 19,450, 2005 WL 2861257 (Nov. 1, 2005). 
 143. SEC v. Stummer, Litigation Release No. 20,529, 93 SEC Docket 115 (Apr. 17, 2008), 
available at 2008 WL 1756796. 
 144. Dorozhko, 91 SEC Docket 2514; Blue Bottle Lit. Rel. I, 2007 WL 580798, at *1; Lohmus Lit. 
Rel. I, 2005 WL 2861257, at *1. 
 145. Blue Bottle Lit. Rel. I, 2007 WL 580798, at *1. 
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acquiring the information was sufficiently connected to the defendants’ 
securities transactions to warrant a finding of liability under Rule 10b-5.146
The district judges in the first two computer-hacker cases granted the 
relief requested by the SEC, but without issuing a published decision.
 
147 In 
the first case, the district judge granted the SEC’s emergency request for a 
temporary restraining order, which, among other things, froze the 
defendants’ assets and ordered the repatriation of funds taken out of the 
United States.148 All of the defendants later settled with the SEC, consenting 
to a permanent injunction and agreeing to pay more than $13 million in 
disgorgement and a combined penalty of $2 million.149 In the second case, 
the district judge granted the SEC’s request to freeze assets and ordered the 
repatriation of funds;150 the court later entered a default judgment ordering 
the payment of $2.7 million in disgorgement and the imposition of an $8 
million penalty.151 The SEC’s release quotes the court’s conclusion that the 
defendants violated Rule 10b-5 by their “‘deceptive conduct in obtaining 
material, non-public information,’ as well as by trading while in possession of 
that information.”152
The defendant’s fate in the third computer hacker case, SEC v. 
Dorozhko,
 
153 remains uncertain. After initially granting the SEC’s motion to 
freeze the proceeds of the defendant’s trades, the district judge ruled in his 
favor, reasoning, in a lengthy opinion, that she was “constrained to hold that 
[the defendant’s] alleged ‘stealing and trading’ or ‘hacking and trading’ 
does not amount to a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because [the 
defendant] did not breach any fiduciary or similar duty ‘in connection with’ 
the purchase or sale of a security.”154
 
 146. Dorozhko, 91 SEC Docket 2514; Lohmus Lit. Rel. I, 2005 WL 2861257, at *2. 
 The district judge thus bucked the tide 
and refused to expand the offense of insider trading beyond the parameters 
 147. SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd. & Stokes (Blue Bottle Lit. Rel. II), Litigation Release No. 20,095, 
2007 WL 1238669, at *1 (Apr. 27, 2007); SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann (Lohmus Lit. Rel. 
III), Litigation Release No. 20,134, 2007 WL 1574065, at *1 (May 31, 2007); SEC v. Lohmus 
Haavel & Viisemann (Lohmus Lit. Rel. II), Litigation Release No. 19,810, 2006 WL 2422653, at *1 
(Aug. 22, 2006); Lohmus Lit. Rel. I, 2005 WL 2861257, at *1. 
 148. Lohmus Lit. Rel. I, 2005 WL 2861257, at *1. 
 149. Lohmus Lit. Rel. III, 2007 WL 1574065, at *1; Lohmus Lit. Rel. II, 2006 WL 2422653, at 
*1. Although SEC rules do not allow defendants settling an enforcement action to 
simultaneously deny the allegations in the complaint, the rules do permit defendants to settle 
“without either admitting or denying” the charges against them. NAGY ET AL., supra note 28, at 
668. Unless otherwise specified, all of the settlements discussed in this Article involved 
defendants who neither admitted nor denied the SEC’s charges. 
 150. Blue Bottle Lit. Rel. I, 2007 WL 580798, at *1. 
 151. Blue Bottle Lit. Rel. II, 2007 WL 1238669, at *1. 
 152. Id. 
 153. SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 07 Civ. 9606, 2008 WL 126612 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2008). 
 154. Id. at *2. 
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set out in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan.155 The Second Circuit, however, 
quickly granted the SEC’s request to stay the district court’s decision to lift 
the asset freeze, pending the SEC’s appeal from the district court’s denial of 
its motion for a preliminary injunction.156
While not involving computer hacking as such, the SEC’s case against 
the cybersnoop is equally at odds with O’Hagan’s “deception by a fiduciary” 
paradigm.
 Thus, the stock proceeds from the 
alleged computer hacking remain frozen notwithstanding the defendant’s 
lack of a fiduciary relationship with the source of the information. The 
frozen assets coupled with the passage of time suggest that the Second 
Circuit may be predisposed to the government’s position. 
157 The SEC alleged that the defendant had fraudulently obtained 
material nonpublic information about an impending acquisition of a 
restaurant company and then used that information to trade securities.158 
Specifically, while a guest in the home of his sister and her husband, the 
defendant allegedly “snuck into [his] brother-in-law’s bedroom office, 
where, secretly and without permission, he accessed his brother-in-law’s 
bedroom office computer.”159 Having correctly guessed his brother-in-law’s 
password, the defendant was able to obtain unauthorized access to a 
computer network that contained several confidential and nonpublic e-mails 
relating to an upcoming acquisition.160 The SEC claimed that the defendant 
used this information to buy 5,500 shares in the restaurant company, which 
resulted in a profit of $22,351 from the sale of the stock after the company 
announced the acquisition.161 The defendant settled with the SEC, 
consented to the entry of an injunction under Section 10(b), and agreed to 
pay a total of $46,386 in disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and a civil 
penalty in an amount equal to his profit.162
 
 155. See id. at *1 (“To eliminate the fiduciary requirement now would be to undo decades 
of Supreme Court precedent, and rewrite the law as it has developed. It is beyond the purview 
of this Court to do so.”). 
 
 156. Brief of Appellant, SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 08-0201-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2008), available 
at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/1443629/SEC-v-Dorozhko (granting the SEC’s motion for a 
stay of the district court’s decision to lift the asset freeze against the defendant). 
 157. Stummer, 93 SEC Docket 115 (announcing defendant’s consent to the entry of a final 
judgment). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Stummer, 93 SEC Docket 115. Equally at odds with the fiduciary principle is the 
settlement obtained in SEC v. Wilson, Litigation Release No. 18,496, 81 SEC Docket 2572 (Dec. 
9, 2003), available at 2003 WL 22907913. In that case, the defendant, while alone in the house of 
his daughter and son-in-law, found confidential documents belonging to the son-in-law while 
“searching for paper supplies in the pantry.” Id. The confidential information pertained to the 
possible acquisition of the company employing his son-in-law. Id. Although it would have been 
difficult for the SEC to prove that the defendant had been “entrusted” with material nonpublic 
information, the defendant agreed to disgorge his trading profit of $21,132, pay prejudgment 
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The SEC’s victories in cases against computer hackers and cybersnoops 
have fueled the demise of fiduciary limitations in the law of insider trading. 
Yet strong arguments involving both policy and doctrine support the result. 
Indeed, the outcomes in all of the resolved cases—as well as the asset freeze 
order in the pending one—fully comport with the policy objectives set forth 
in O’Hagan. As the Court emphasized, “investors likely would hesitate to 
venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated 
nonpublic information is unchecked by law.”163 Moreover, as we shall see in 
the final Part of this Article, the SEC’s litigation theory of “deceptive 
acquisition” of confidential information meets the textual demands of Rule 
10b-5 and finds substantial support in recent Court precedents interpreting 
Rule 10b-5 outside the realm of insider trading.164
2. Liability for the Brazen Fiduciary 
 But in contrast to the 
theories of insider trading liability endorsed by the Court in Chiarella, Dirks, 
and O’Hagan, a theory extending Rule 10b-5 liability to insider trading by 
computer hackers or cybersnoops would not have a fiduciary principle at its 
core. 
Recall that O’Hagan involved a fact pattern in which an attorney kept 
secret from his law firm and its client his intention to use for personal profit 
their confidential tender-offer information, and the Court viewed this secret 
intent to trade as essential to its finding that he had engaged in deception 
within the meaning of Section 10(b).165 The Court in O’Hagan went so far as 
to maintain that a fiduciary’s full disclosure to the source of the information 
about an intent to trade would foreclose liability under the misappropriation 
theory.166 I previously termed this type of insider trader a “brazen fiduciary,” 
and I predicted trouble for the government in any case where a defendant 
made such a brazen disclosure.167
Yet the First Circuit’s recent decision in SEC v. Rocklage
 Although this safe harbor for brazen 
fiduciaries never made much sense as a normative matter, it was necessary to 
ensure that the securities trading constituted deception rather than merely 
the breach of a fiduciary duty. 
168
 
interest, and pay a civil penalty of $26,415—an amount equal to 1.25 times his profit. Id. The 
defendant also consented to an injunction against further violations of Section 10(b). Id. 
 essentially 
eviscerates O’Hagan’s dictate that a fiduciary’s full disclosure to his principal 
forecloses Rule 10b-5 liability. The case involved sales of stock in a 
pharmaceutical company by the brother-in-law of the company’s CEO, who 
 163. Id. 
 164. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 165. See supra text accompanying notes 90–93, 105–106. 
 166. See supra text accompanying note 107. 
 167. See Nagy, supra note 23, at 1256–59. 
 168. SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006). 
A4 - NAGY_INITIAL 5/31/2009 7:50 PM 
THE GRADUAL DEMISE OF FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES 1345 
had received a tip from his sister (the CEO’s wife).169 Emphasizing the 
importance of confidentiality, the CEO had shared with his wife secret bad 
news involving the failure of a clinical drug trial, and discussed his belief that 
the news, when made public, would cause the company’s stock price to drop 
significantly.170
In defending the charge of Rule 10b-5 liability for illegal tipping, the 
wife did not deny that she had shared this secret bad news with her brother, 
who then sold stock in the company to avoid substantial losses.
 
171 Rather, 
she contended that prior to tipping her brother, she informed her husband 
of her intent to do so, and thus did not deceive her husband within the 
meaning of Section 10(b).172 Her defense, in fact, made very clear that she 
brazenly signaled her brother as to the imminent bad news notwithstanding 
her husband’s strong objection.173
In straining to distinguish the wife’s pre-trading disclosure from the 
brazen fiduciary scenario noted in O’Hagan, the First Circuit emphasized 
that the wife had obtained the confidential information through “deceptive 
acquisition.”
 
174 That is, taking as true the SEC’s contention that the wife had 
a “pre-existing” agreement with her brother to share information “with a 
wink and a nod,”175 the court reasoned that she did absolutely nothing to 
correct her husband’s mistaken understanding that she would keep the drug 
trial results confidential.176 So, while her tipping of the information may not 
have been deceptive, the deceptive means by which she acquired the 
information from her husband was sufficient to trigger Rule 10b-5 liability. 
In the court’s view, this stood in contrast to the facts of O’Hagan, where the 
defendant had acquired his information “legitimately.”177
 
 169. Id. at 3–4. 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. In addition to the CEO’s wife and the CEO’s brother-in-law, the third defendant in 
the case was a close friend and neighbor of the brother-in-law, who had sold stock in the 
pharmaceutical company after the brother-in-law relayed the information to him. Id. at 4. 
 172. See id. at 11 (noting the defendants’ argument “that a pre-tip disclosure to the source 
of an intention to trade or tip completely eliminates any deception involved in the 
transaction”). The court further noted the defendants’ argument “that O’Hagan put no 
qualifiers on what is meant by ‘disclos[ure] to the source’ of a plan to trade on nonpublic 
information, and so the SEC is not free to qualify the concept.” Id. 
 173. See Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 11. 
 174. Id. at 12. 
 175. Id. at 4. 
 176. Id. at 3 (recounting the SEC’s allegations that “Mrs. Rocklage initially concealed from 
her husband her prior agreement with her brother to tip him if she learned significant negative 
information about the company” and that “[s]he also concealed that she did not intend to 
maintain the confidentiality that her husband had reasonably understood to bind her”). 
 177. See id. at 9. The court stated that “[a]rguably, the language in O’Hagan can be read to 
create a ‘safe harbor’ if there is disclosure to the fiduciary principal of an intention to trade on 
or tip legitimately acquired information.” Id. at 12; see also id. (stating that “[u]nlike this case, 
O’Hagan was not a case which involved the deceptive acquisition of information”). 
A4 - NAGY_INITIAL 5/31/2009 7:50 PM 
1346 94  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2009] 
Yet the court’s understanding that James O’Hagan had acquired his 
information “legitimately” hardly seems consistent with the facts of that case. 
O’Hagan could be said to have deceived both his law firm and its client into 
entrusting him with confidential information about the client’s plans to 
launch a tender offer for Pillsbury stock. That is, O’Hagan “feigned fidelity” 
to his partners at the law firm and thus “duped” them into believing that he 
would retain the confidentiality of their secrets. But had he fully disclosed to 
them his prior embezzlement of unrelated client funds and his desperate 
need for money to cover that crime,178 O’Hagan’s law-firm partners 
undoubtedly would have blocked his access to confidential business 
information. Thus, O’Hagan’s overall scheme could be said to have involved 
both “deceptive acquisition” and deceptive trading. Viewed in this way, the 
factual distinction between O’Hagan’s trading and the wife’s tipping 
disappears. O’Hagan’s statement that “full disclosure forecloses [Rule 10b-5] 
liability under the misappropriation theory”179
That is not to say, however, that O’Hagan’s safe harbor for brazen 
fiduciaries should be preserved. A theory of Rule 10b-5 liability that would 
permit the prosecution of persons who have traded securities on the basis of 
wrongfully obtained information would far better serve O’Hagan’s policy 
justifications for prohibiting insider trading.
 should apply not only to 
O’Hagan’s trading but also to the tipping and trading in Rocklage. 
180
3. Tippee Liability in the Absence of a Tipper’s Personal Benefit 
 Pursuant to such a theory, 
the Rocklage court’s finding that the wife shared information contrary to her 
husband’s strict instructions could have established the necessary element of 
wrongfulness. And her brother’s trading on the basis of that wrongfully 
obtained information would have rendered both his trading and his sister’s 
tipping a violation of Rule 10b-5. However, such a theory of Rule 10b-5 
liability is analytically distinct from O’Hagan’s theory of “deception by a 
fiduciary’s silence.” 
In contrast to O’Hagan’s misappropriation theory, which focuses on a 
fiduciary’s deception of the information’s source, Chiarella’s classical theory 
turns on a fiduciary’s deceptive silence in securities transactions with a 
corporation’s shareholders.181 As we have seen, Dirks extended this theory to 
certain instances of tippee trading, holding explicitly that a tippee assumes a 
fiduciary duty to a corporation’s shareholders only when the insider has 
disclosed confidential information to the tippee for a personal benefit.182
 
 178. See supra note 
 
92 and accompanying text (discussing O’Hagan’s conviction in state 
court for the theft of client funds). 
 179. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997). 
 180. See infra Part IV.B. 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 43–49. 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 73–75. 
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Dirks’s focus on the tipper’s motivation would seem to require a finding of 
liability on the part of a tipper before a court could impose tippee liability 
under Rule 10b-5. Yet, in United States v. Evans,183 the Seventh Circuit held 
that a tippee may be found guilty of violating Rule 10b-5 even though his 
tipper had been acquitted of illegal tipping at a previous trial.184
The tippee–defendant in that case, Ryan Evans, allegedly used 
confidential information about upcoming mergers and tender offers to 
purchase stock in the subject companies.
 Once 
again, a court jettisoned fiduciary principles where the facts evidenced the 
use of improperly obtained confidential information. 
185 The alleged tipper was a close 
friend of Evans who had worked as a financial analyst at Credit-Suisse First 
Boston.186 At Evans’s first trial, where prosecutors tried him and his tipper–
friend jointly, the jury acquitted the friend on charges of conspiracy as well 
as for violations of Rule 10b-5.187 The jury also acquitted Evans on the 
conspiracy charge, but it deadlocked on the charges of insider trading.188 At 
Evans’s re-trial, the jury found him guilty of violating Rule 10b-5.189
In its opinion affirming the jury’s verdict, the Seventh Circuit explicitly 
acknowledged Dirks’s two pre-conditions for tippee liability under Rule 10b-
5: “there must have been a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty” for a 
personal benefit, and “‘the tippee knows or should know that there has been 
a breach.’”
 
190 The court, however, did not view the first jury’s acquittal of 
the tipper–friend as dispositive to the issue of Evans’s guilt.191 The court 
reasoned that from the victim’s perspective, the breach of an insider’s duty 
of confidentiality was “equally damaging whether [the insider] acted willfully 
or negligently.”192
 
 183. United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 The court thus maintained that tippee liability would be 
appropriate in instances “[w]here an insider is duped into breaching her 
 184. Id. at 322. 
 185. Id. at 318–20. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 320. 
 188. Evans, 486 F.3d at 320. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 321–22 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983)). 
 191. Id. at 323–24. The court reasoned that: 
Reviewing the jury’s verdict and the evidence at trial . . . the jury concluded that 
[the tipper] had a duty of confidentiality as a corporate insider (derivatively 
through Credit Suisse), breached it by giving Evans the information as a gift, but 
did not act with the requisite level of intent nor enter into an actual agreement 
with Evans. 
Id. at 323. The court also speculated that the jury might have found that the tipper “did not 
receive any benefit from giving out the information, even the benefit of a gift, if he did not 
think that he was violating clients’ confidentiality.” Id. This speculation was necessary because 
the court had to rule on the collateral estoppel effect of the verdicts in the first trial. 
 192. Id. at 323. 
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duty of confidentiality and the tippee who induces that breach willfully 
trades on the information, knowing its disclosure to be improper.”193 The 
court concluded that “[w]here the tippee has a relationship with the insider 
and the tippee knows the breach to be improper, the tippee may be liable 
for trading on the ill-gotten information,” even if “the tipper [did not] know 
that his disclosure was improper.”194
To be sure, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning supports the policy 
objectives highlighted in O’Hagan, namely, ensuring market integrity and 
fostering investor confidence. The jury concluded that Evans knew or was 
reckless in not knowing that his friend’s communication violated the duty of 
confidentiality that his friend owed to his investment-bank employer.
 
195 
Thus, Evans was certainly trading on information obtained improperly 
through a breach of the duty of care. But if the friend did not, in fact, know 
that his disclosures of confidential information to Evans were improper, it is 
difficult to see how the friend could have breached the duty of loyalty for a 
personal benefit.196
4. The Debate over “Possession vs. Use” 
 And without the finding of a breach of loyalty on the 
part of the tipper, it is difficult to see how Evans could have inherited a 
derivative duty of disclosure. The limitations imposed by Dirks’s requirement 
of a “personal benefit” would seem to forestall liability, although it is not 
surprising that policy considerations would sway a court to interpret Rule 
10b-5 to find otherwise. 
Despite the longstanding acceptance of Chiarella’s classical theory of 
insider trading, there remained an important question that went 
unanswered for almost two decades: whether Rule 10b-5 obliges insiders to 
“disclose or abstain” from trading securities on all occasions when they are 
in possession of material nonpublic information or on only those occasions 
when insiders are affirmatively using that information in a securities 
transaction.197 Often termed the “possession vs. use” debate,198
 
 193. Evans, 486 F.3d at 323. The court further stated that “where a tippee, for example, 
induces a tipper to breach her corporate duty, even if the tipper does not do so knowingly or 
willfully, the tippee can still be liable for trading on the improperly provided information.” Id. 
 this 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 323. 
 196. Because Evans’s friend was not a temporary insider in all of the companies in which 
Evans bought stock, some of the trades for which the jury convicted Evans would have been 
prosecuted under the misappropriation theory. However, courts generally apply Dirks’s 
requirement of a personal benefit in misappropriation cases, notwithstanding that Dirks was a 
case under the classical theory. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 36, at 2-71 to -74. 
 197. See Donna M. Nagy, The “Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of Securities Trading by 
Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never Be Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (1999). 
 198. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1066 (9th Cir. 1998) (referring to the “use-
possession” debate), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1071 (1999); see also Allan Horwich, Possession Versus 
Use: Is There a Causation Element in the Prohibition on Insider Trading?, 52 BUS. LAW. 1235 (1997) 
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controversy persisted for years without judicial attention because inside 
traders rarely acknowledge possessing material nonpublic information while 
simultaneously disaffirming having used it. 
Given the centrality of fiduciary principles to the classical theory of 
insider trading, one would have expected to see extensive discussion of 
those principles once the “possession vs. use” debate was finally litigated. But 
in the two circuit-court decisions that addressed the question directly, SEC v. 
Adler199 and United States v. Smith,200 the courts essentially ignored the 
fiduciary dictate that was at the heart of Chiarella’s classical theory.201 Both 
the Eleventh Circuit in Adler and the Ninth Circuit in Smith rejected the 
government’s arguments for a test of “knowing possession,” adopting instead 
a test of “use.”202
One of the defendants in Adler was a director who had learned at a 
regularly scheduled board meeting that the company would be losing all, or 
a substantial portion, of its orders from one of its largest customers.
 Yet despite frequent citations to Chiarella and Dirks, neither 
court gave much attention to their fiduciary foundation. 
203 The 
director then sold, within a week of the meeting, a significant number of his 
previously owned shares of stock. The SEC contended that the director, as 
an insider, violated Rule 10b-5 because he traded in company stock while in 
possession of material nonpublic information that he failed to disclose to 
shareholders.204 In the SEC’s view, the director’s failure to “disclose or 
abstain” defrauded the shareholders who had purchased his stock in 
ignorance of the corporation’s impending announcement of bad news.205
The director’s defense to Rule 10b-5 liability emphasized that he had 
not misused any material nonpublic information in his securities 
 
 
(the possession vs. use debate focuses on “whether there is a distinction between (i) 
affirmatively using material inside information to trade, and (ii) trading while in possession of 
material inside information but without making deliberate use of the information”). 
 199. SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 200. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1051. 
 201. Prior to Adler and Smith, the most thorough judicial analysis of the “possession vs. use” 
issue was dicta in United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120–21 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 202. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337; Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068–69. 
 203. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1328. 
 204. Id. at 1332. 
 205. See Brief of Appellant at 20–21, Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (No. 96-6084), 1997 WL 33487156. 
The SEC maintained that: 
When a corporate insider like [the director–defendant] has information relating 
to his company’s stock that he knows (or is reckless in not knowing) to be non-
public and material and he trades in the company’s stock, he deceives the persons 
on the other side of his trades by not disclosing to them the information, whether 
or not he “uses” the information in his trading. This is because, even if the 
information is not a factor in his decision to trade, he knows that the persons on 
the other side of his trades are trading in ignorance of it. 
Id. at 18. 
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transactions. Specifically, he presented rather compelling evidence that 
these stock sales “were not made as a result of any alleged material 
nonpublic information, but were part of a preexisting plan to sell [the] 
stock.”206 Thus, the director contended that his lack of motive to personally 
profit from the use of material nonpublic information insulated him from 
Rule 10b-5 liability. Agreeing with the defendant’s argument, the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that “mere knowing possession—i.e., proof that an insider 
traded while in possession of material nonpublic information—is not a per se 
violation” of Rule 10b-5.207
The Eleventh Circuit based its support of a “use” test on Section 10(b)’s 
textual requirement of a “manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance.”
 
208 In the court’s view, the element of deception could be 
satisfied only if the director actually used the material nonpublic 
information in his securities transaction.209
When an insider trades on the basis of material nonpublic 
information, the insider is clearly breaching a fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders and deriving personal gain from the use of the 
nonpublic information. On the other hand, we do not believe that 
the SEC’s knowing possession test would always and inevitably be 
limited to situations involving fraud.
 It reasoned that: 
210
The court thus adopted a view of fiduciary duty that essentially ignored the 
disclosure obligation on which the classical theory is premised. 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Smith, a criminal prosecution against an 
officer of the issuer, relied heavily on the reasoning in Adler.211
 
 206. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1328. The director–defendant presented evidence that his 
preexisting plans to sell the stock were made “in order to buy an eighteen wheel truck for his 
son’s business”; that he sold as soon as a 120-day lock-up on the stock had expired; that he sold 
only a small percentage of his shares in the corporation; and that he spoke with his broker 
more than a week before he learned the alleged material nonpublic information. Id. at 1328–
29. The director presented further evidence that he pre-cleared his trades (as he was required 
to do) with the corporation’s general counsel. Id. at 1329. 
 However, 
instead of viewing the defendant’s “use” of material nonpublic information 
as a prerequisite to deception, the Smith court viewed the use of such 
 207. Id. at 1337. The court maintained, however, that the SEC is entitled to a rebuttable 
inference of use based on facts demonstrating that an insider traded while in possession of 
material nonpublic information. Id. at 1337–38. 
 208. Id. at 1332. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1332. 
 211. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the 
Eleventh Circuit in Adler was “the only court of appeals [that] squarely . . . consider[ed] the 
causation issue” and expressing agreement with Adler’s conclusion that “a ‘use’ requirement 
[was] more consistent with the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5”); see also id. at 1068 (“Like 
our colleagues on the Eleventh Circuit, we are concerned that the SEC’s ‘knowing possession’ 
standard would not be—indeed, could not be—strictly limited to those situations actually 
involving intentional fraud.”). 
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information as a fact necessary to establish the insider’s scienter.212
[I]f the insider merely possesses and does not use, the [insider and 
his purchaser or seller] are trading on a level playing field; if the 
insider merely possesses and does not use, both individuals are 
“making their decisions on the basis of incomplete information.” It 
is the insider’s use, not his possession, that gives rise to an 
informational advantage and the requisite intent to defraud.
 The 
court reasoned that: 
213
With this emphasis on Section 10(b)’s scienter requirement, the Smith court 
concluded that an “investor who has a preexisting plan to trade, and who 
carries through with that plan after coming into possession of material 
nonpublic information, does not intend to defraud or deceive; he simply 
intends to implement his pre-possession financial strategy.”
 
214
The Adler and Smith courts plainly viewed the wrongful use of material 
nonpublic information as the crux of the Rule 10b-5 violation. However, that 
view of insider trading adds a gloss missing from the classical theory 
articulated by Justice Powell in Chiarella. Indeed, the dictate that “a 
corporate insider must abstain from trading in the shares of his corporation 
unless he has first disclosed all material inside information known to him”
 
215 
focuses specifically on the information that the insider possesses but the 
shareholder does not. Thus, in reading Rule 10b-5 to require a causal 
connection between the information and the securities trading, Adler and 
Smith overlooked Chiarella’s core: when a defendant stands in a fiduciary 
relationship to the shareholders with whom he is trading, his silence about 
material facts constitutes deception.216 Adler and Smith also overlooked a 
host of common-law deceit decisions, which, consistent with the fiduciary 
principle, emphasized the shareholders’ right to know the material facts 
possessed by the insider.217
 
 212. See Roberta Karmel, The Controversy of Possession Versus Use, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 1998, at 4–
5. 
 
 213. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068. Because Smith was a criminal proceeding, the court rejected 
the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion in Adler that proof of an insider’s possession of material 
nonpublic information at the time of the trade entitles the government to an inference of use. 
Id. at 1069. Rather, taking no position on the SEC’s burden in a civil case, the court held that 
Rule 10b-5 requires that the government “demonstrate that the suspected inside trader actually 
used material nonpublic information in consummating his transaction.” Id. at 1069 & n.27. 
 214. Id. at 1068. 
 215. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 
40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961)). 
 216. Id. at 228; see also Nagy, supra note 197, at 1132. 
 217. See, e.g., Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Van Schaack, 867 P.2d 892, 897–98 (Colo. 
1994) (emphasizing that “directors of a corporation and its controlling shareholders [must] act 
with an extreme measure of candor, unselfishness, and good faith in relation to remaining 
shareholders” and concluding that “this duty encompasses the obligation to fully disclose all 
material facts and circumstances surrounding or affecting a proposed transaction” (citations 
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But while Adler and Smith may have turned the classical theory’s 
fiduciary principle on its head, the decisions nonetheless find strong support 
in the policy objectives underlying the decisions in both Chiarella and Dirks. 
As Adler and Smith emphasized, concerns that insiders may be unjustly 
enriched through trading on the corporation’s information are implicated 
only on the actual use of confidential information in a securities transaction. 
The “use” test also responds to the Court’s concern with the “‘inherent 
unfairness involved where one takes advantage’ of ‘information intended to 
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of 
anyone.’”218
The courts in Adler and Smith may well have viewed the classical theory’s 
fiduciary principle as simply a means to the policy end of preventing insiders 
from misusing confidential corporate information. If so, they may have cast 
it aside because it was never a very principled principle. 
 
C. SEC INSIDER TRADING RULES 
In August 2000, the SEC invoked its rulemaking authority under 
Section 10(b) to adopt two new insider trading rules.219 Both rules 
responded to lower court rulings. That is, Rule 10b5-1 addressed the 
“possession vs. use” debate and responded to the decisions in Adler and 
Smith.220 Rule 10b5-2 addressed the scope of the misappropriation theory 
and responded to the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Chestman.221
 
omitted)); Blakesley v. Johnson, 608 P.2d 908, 915 (Kan. 1980) (maintaining that a minority 
shareholder “had a legal right on the facts in this case to rely upon [the majority shareholder] 
to make a full disclosure”); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 530, 535, 534 (Kan. 1932) 
(maintaining that “a director negotiating with a shareholder for purchase of shares acts in a 
relation of scrupulous trust and confidence” and concluding that “full and fair disclosure 
required . . . the furnishing of [all] information [in the director’s possession]”); Dawson v. Nat’l 
Life Ins. Co., 157 N.W. 929, 938 (Iowa 1916) (recognizing a cause of action for fraud in 
securities trading when a corporate officer fails to make “full disclosure of all facts bearing 
thereon known to such officer and unknown to the shareholder”); Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277, 
281 (Kan. 1904) (holding that “before any director or managing officer . . . can rightfully 
purchase the stock of one not actively engaged in the management of its affairs, such director 
or managing officer must inform such stockholder of the true condition of the affairs of the 
corporation”); see also Elliott J. Weiss, United States v. O’Hagan: Pragmatism Returns to the Law of 
Insider Trading, 23 J. CORP. L. 395, 399 (1998) (“A shareholder who sold a corporation’s stock to 
an insider in a face-to-face transaction had a right to expect that the insider, as a fiduciary, 
would disclose any material, nonpublic information that he possessed before effectuating the 
transaction.”). 
 Although the SEC intended the two rules to clarify existing 
prohibitions under the classical and misappropriation theories, the SEC’s 
 218. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968)). 
 219. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b5-1, 10b5-2 (2008). See SEC Adopting Release, supra note 14, at 
83,676. 
 220. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 221. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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selective adherence to fiduciary principles has only exacerbated the 
confusion.  
1. Rule 10b5-1 and Its Affirmative Defenses for 
“Preexisting Trading Plans” 
Having lost the “possession vs. use” debate in Adler and Smith, the SEC 
did not relish the possibility of re-litigating this question in other circuits. 
Instead, it opted to resolve the issue through its rulemaking authority under 
Section 10(b). Rule 10b5-1 comes close to endorsing a “knowing possession” 
standard because it causes liability to turn on whether a person traded 
securities while “aware” of material nonpublic information. But the rule also 
reverses a longstanding SEC position. That is, in its release adopting the 
rule, the SEC explicitly acknowledged that an “absolute standard based on 
knowing possession, or awareness, could be overbroad in some respects” and 
that persons with certain trading plans formulated prior to any awareness of 
material nonpublic information should be able to trade under Rule 10b-5 
with impunity.222 Rule 10b5-1 therefore reflects the SEC’s concession (after 
many years of arguing otherwise) that the offense of insider trading involves 
the wrongful use of material nonpublic information and that fiduciary 
principles are only relevant insofar as they establish misuse.223
Rule 10b5-1 sets out a general principle that the “manipulative and 
deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 shall include, 
among other things, securities trading “on the basis of material nonpublic 
information . . . in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed . . . to 
the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other 
person who is the source of the material nonpublic information.”
 
224 The 
rule then defines the phrase “on the basis of” to include securities trading by 
someone who “was aware of the material nonpublic information.”225
Had the SEC stopped there, Rule 10b5-1 would have squarely embraced 
the fiduciary principles set out in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan.
 
226
 
 222. SEC Adopting Release, supra note 
 But the 
14, at 83,692; see also Allan Horwich, The Origin, 
Application, Validity, and Potential Misuse of Rule 10b5-1, 62 BUS. LAW. 913, 924–25 (2007) (“[T]he 
overall structure and rationale for the rule suggest that the SEC recognized that a ‘use’ test was 
the fairest one, even though explicit application of that standard was not something the SEC 
could support as a matter of policy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 223. In its Release proposing Rule 10b5-1, the SEC expressed the view that “[w]henever a 
person purchases or sells a security while aware of material nonpublic information that has been 
improperly obtained, that person has the type of unfair informational advantage over other 
participants in the market that insider trading law is designed to prevent.” Selective Disclosure 
and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259 [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,860 (Dec. 20, 1999) [hereinafter SEC Proposing Release] 
(emphasis added). 
 224. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a). 
 225. Id. § 240.10b5-1(b). 
 226. But see supra notes 50, 98 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court has described the 
relevant duty as one of “trust and confidence”). 
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text of the rule goes on to set out three affirmative defenses to Rule 10b-5 
liability, which, according to the SEC, address the situation in which “a 
person may reach a decision to make a particular trade without any 
awareness of material nonpublic information, but then come into possession 
of such information before the trade actually takes place.”227 Recognizing 
that under a rigid “knowing possession” test Rule 10b-5 liability would 
attach, the SEC sought to specify those particular circumstances under 
which such securities trading would not be illegal. Accordingly, the rule’s 
affirmative defenses preclude liability when a person, before becoming 
aware of the material nonpublic information: (1) had entered into “a 
binding contract” to purchase or sell the security; (2) had provided 
instructions to another person to purchase or sell the security for the 
instructing person’s account; or (3) had adopted a “written plan” for trading 
securities.228
(1) Specified the amount of securities to be purchased or sold and 
the price at which and the date on which the securities were to be 
purchased or sold; 
 Each of these three defenses also requires the person to 
demonstrate that such a contract, instruction, or plan either: 
(2) Included a written formula or algorithm, or computer 
program, for determining the amount of securities to be purchased 
or sold and the price at which and the date on which the securities 
were to be purchased or sold; or 
(3) Did not permit the person to exercise any subsequent influence 
over how, when, or whether to effect purchases or sales; provided, 
in addition, that any other person who . . . did exercise such 
influence must not have been aware of the material nonpublic 
information when doing so.229
The rule also strictly limits the availability of these affirmative defenses to 
circumstances in which the contract, plan, or instruction to trade is “entered 
into in good faith and not as part of a plan or scheme to evade the 
prohibitions of [the rule].”
 
230 Moreover, the rule makes clear that these 
affirmative defenses are available to both entities and natural persons.231
 
 227. See SEC Proposing Release, supra note 
 
223, at 82,860; see also SEC v. Healthsouth Corp., 
261 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1322 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (“[I]t is a defense to an allegation of violation of 
Section 10b and Rule 10b5-1, if the person making the purchase or sale demonstrates that the 
purchase or sale that occurred was made pursuant to a plan.”). 
 228. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(1)–(3). 
 229. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(1)–(3). 
 230. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(ii). 
 231. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1), (2). As other commentators have observed, Rule 10b5-1’s 
application in criminal cases may be susceptible to challenge. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 
14, at 4-124 (noting that “in criminal cases, the issue may arise whether Rule 10b5-1 violates the 
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Rule 10b5-1’s affirmative defenses clash considerably with the fiduciary 
principle established in Chiarella. As we have seen, at least in those common-
law jurisdictions recognizing a fiduciary relationship between the 
corporation’s shareholders and its officers and directors, an insider would 
be liable for deceit if he remained silent about material facts in a transaction 
with a shareholder.232 It would not have mattered whether the insider’s 
decision to trade the corporation’s securities had pre-existed his knowledge 
of that information. Rather, common-law cases emphasized both the 
shareholder’s “right to know” the material nonpublic information possessed 
by the insider and the unfairness to the shareholder that resulted from the 
insider’s decision to remain silent about the material facts.233 And the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Chiarella that “a corporate insider must 
abstain from trading in the shares of his corporation unless he has first 
disclosed all material inside information known to him” mirrors this 
common-law dictate.234
Why, then, did the SEC promulgate a “pre-existing trade plan” safe 
harbor that ignores its prior position and the underlying command of 
Chiarella? Once again, pragmatism has trumped doctrinal consistency with 
the fiduciary principle. Justice Powell intended the fiduciary principle to 
limit the category of defendants who could be liable for trading on the basis 
of material nonpublic information.
 
235 His policy goal was to prohibit 
insiders from profiting, directly or indirectly, from the misuse of 
confidential corporate information, and the fiduciary principle reflected in 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts provided him with the means to that end. But 
an absolute rule of full disclosure in securities transactions between insiders 
and shareholders would prohibit securities trading even if the decision to 
buy or sell the securities was made well in advance of the insider’s awareness 
of confidential information. The affirmative defenses in Rule 10b5-1 allow 
officers and directors (and others) to prove that they did not use material 
nonpublic information in their transaction and, thus, establish that they did 
not misuse such information. The paradox is that Rule 10b-5 has 
traditionally broadened the protections against fraud and deceit that were 
available for securities investors under the common law, and the SEC has 
consistently advocated this broad reading.236
 
due process clause of the [Fifth] Amendment by placing the burden on the defendant to show 
that he or she did not in fact trade ‘on the basis’ of information of which he or she was aware”). 
 Yet, at least in the context of 
one-on-one securities transactions between an insider and a shareholder, the 
common law of fraud and deceit would provide the shareholder with 
protection that is no longer available under Rule 10b-5. 
 232. See supra text accompanying note 44 and supra note 217. 
 233. See supra note 217. 
 234. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). 
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54. 
 236. See infra text accompanying notes 349–353. 
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Consider, for example, a director who, on March 1, personally solicits a 
shareholder to sell him 1,000 shares of stock in the corporation for $10,000, 
with the sale to take place on March 31. At the time the director proposes 
this plan, he is not aware of any material information that is being withheld 
from the corporation’s shareholders. Assume further that the shareholder 
agrees to the terms of the director’s proposal and that plan is reduced to 
writing, though it does not constitute a binding contract. Under the 
common law, if the director came into possession of secret good news about 
the company over the ensuing month, that director would be obligated to 
share the good news with the shareholder prior to buying the stock.237
Yet, under the affirmative defenses in Rule 10b5-1, that same director 
could execute that very same pre-existing trading plan without incurring 
liability under Rule 10b-5. Given the face-to-face nature of this transaction, 
this result seems anomalous. After all, these facts demonstrate a corporate 
shareholder’s detrimental reliance on an insider’s silence. But Rule 10b5-1 
does not draw a distinction between trading plans developed in the context 
of one-on-one transactions and trading plans formed for transactions that 
will occur over anonymous securities markets.
 He 
could not remain silent about the material facts and purchase the stock at 
the previously agreed to price. And if the director nonetheless completed 
the purchase without full disclosure of these new-found facts, the 
shareholder would have a cause of action for deceit. 
238
One could certainly make an argument that Rule 10b5-1’s affirmative 
defenses for pre-existing plans are troubling only in the context of face-to-
face securities transactions. Transactions over the NYSE or the NASDAQ do 
not involve situations where shareholders can demonstrate that they actually 
relied on an insider’s silence. Now, however, we have a second paradox. As 
 
 
 237. See cases cited supra note 217. 
 238. Rule 105b-1’s affirmative defenses may also have changed the result in Jordan v. Duff & 
Phelps Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), a well-known decision by Judge Frank Easterbrook over 
a dissent by Judge Richard Posner. The case involved a former employee of Duff & Phelps who 
sued the company under Rule 10b-5 for repurchasing his stock without disclosing material 
nonpublic information relating to the possibility of a merger between the corporation and 
another firm. Id. at 433. The former employee asserted that had he known of the impending 
merger, he would have postponed his decision to retire, and thus would not have been 
obligated, pursuant to a buy-sell agreement, to surrender his stock at book value. Id. at 432–33. 
Viewing the employee’s retirement decision as, in effect, an investment decision, the Seventh 
Circuit held that the company may have violated Rule 10b-5 by remaining silent and 
repurchasing the employee’s shares when it owed him a fiduciary duty of disclosure. Id. at 437–
39. Yet, had Rule 10b5-1 been in place, the company could have asserted an affirmative defense 
based on a “pre-existing” trade plan. That is, prior to its awareness of the possibility of a merger, 
the company had entered into a binding contract under which it was obligated to purchase all 
of the employee’s shares at a specified price (book value) and at a specified time (the 
employee’s resignation from the company). Id. at 432. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 10b5-1, 
the company may have been entitled to remain silent while purchasing the shares from the 
uninformed seller. 
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Professor Louis Loss observed more than a decade before Chiarella: “it would 
be a strange rule of fiduciary conduct that permitted the fiduciary to hide 
behind a mass of agents for unnamed principals—which is essentially what a 
stock exchange is.”239
However, in all likelihood, the SEC did not intend Rule 10b5-1 to 
conform to the principle that insiders owe a fiduciary duty of disclosure in 
transactions with the corporation’s shareholders. Rather, the SEC 
promulgated Rule 10b5-1 in the wake of the developing consensus by courts 
and the SEC that insider trading involves the intentional misuse of 
confidential information. The insider who remains silent in the face of 
material facts acquired subsequent to the development of a trading plan may 
violate a disclosure obligation owed to a shareholder in a one-on-one 
transaction.
 
240
2. Rule 10b5-2 and Its Application to Confidentiality Agreements 
 But that insider is not in any sense making use of improperly 
obtained information and is thus not engaging in illegal insider trading. 
Ironically, and circuitously, the policy goal sought by Justice Powell in 
Chiarella has now found its way into positive law. 
To determine the applicability of the misappropriation theory in the 
years leading up to O’Hagan, lower courts examined whether the source of 
the information and the person who traded (or tipped) had a fiduciary 
relationship or “similar relationship of trust and confidence.”241 The 
O’Hagan Court said nothing about this relationship other than to 
characterize it as involving “trust and confidence” and “loyalty and 
confidentiality.”242 In the wake of O’Hagan, many courts looked to the 
Second Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Chestman, which 
extensively analyzed the necessary elements of a fiduciary relationship or its 
“functional equivalent.”243
The Chestman court reversed an insider trading conviction under Rule 
10b-5 because, in the majority’s view, the government did not sustain its 
burden of proving a fiduciary-like relationship between the tipper and the 
source of the information.
 
244
 
 239. Louis Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate “Insiders” in the United 
States, 33 MOD. L. REV. 34, 47 (1970). 
 Although the tipper was married to the source, 
 240. See supra note 217. 
 241. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citing United 
States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1028–29 (2d Cir. 1986)), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 484 
U.S. 19 (1987)); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Newman, 664 
F.2d 12, 17–18 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 242. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
 243. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568. 
 244. Id. at 554. The Second Circuit also reversed the defendant’s conviction under the 
mail-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, but it affirmed his conviction under Rule 14e-3, an SEC 
rule that prohibits insider trading in the context of tender offers. Id. Rule 14e-3 is discussed at 
supra note 30. 
A4 - NAGY_INITIAL 5/31/2009 7:50 PM 
1358 94  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2009] 
and the information was imparted in confidence, the Second Circuit 
reasoned that “marriage does not, without more, create a fiduciary 
relationship”245 and that “a fiduciary duty cannot be imposed unilaterally by 
entrusting a person with confidential information.”246
A fiduciary relationship involves discretionary authority and 
dependency: One person depends on another—the fiduciary—to 
serve his interests. In relying on a fiduciary to act for his benefit, 
the beneficiary of the relation may entrust the fiduciary with 
custody over property of one sort or another. Because the fiduciary 
obtains access to this property to serve the ends of the fiduciary 
relationship, he becomes duty-bound not to appropriate the 
property for his own use. . . . These characteristics represent the 
measure of the paradigmatic fiduciary relationship. A similar 
relationship of trust and confidence consequently must share these 
qualities.
 Rather, as the Second 
Circuit saw it: 
247
Other courts, following Chestman, emphasized that “[q]ualifying 
relationships are marked by the fact that the party in whom confidence is 
reposed has entered into a relationship in which he or she acts to serve the 
interests of the party entrusting him or her with such information.”
 
248
One noteworthy decision relying on Chestman’s construction of the 
fiduciary-relationship requirement is United States v. Kim.
 
249 There, the court 
dismissed an indictment charging insider trading based on the 
misappropriation theory, despite the defendant’s explicit agreement to 
maintain the confidentiality of the information.250 Both the defendant and 
the source of the information belonged to a local chapter of the Young 
Presidents Organization (“YPO”), a nationwide association of company 
presidents under the age of fifty.251 YPO required club members to comply 
with a written “Confidentiality Commitment,” which the government alleged 
the defendant had violated by purchasing securities in a takeover target 
based on information shared during a YPO retreat.252
 
 245. Id. at 568 (emphasizing that a “‘similar relationship of trust and confidence’ . . . must 
be the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship”). 
 The court, however, 
 246. Id. at 567. 
 247. Id. at 569. 
 248. United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 234–35 (2d Cir. 2001). The Chestman view, 
however, was not universal. See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1272 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(addressing the misappropriation theory in the context of a spousal relationship and 
concluding that Chestman ignores “the many instances in which a spouse has a reasonable 
expectation of confidentiality”). 
 249. United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 250. Id. at 1008. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
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disagreed with the government’s view that club members had a special 
“fiduciary-like” relationship with each other.253 Citing Chestman, the court 
emphasized that “the primary essential characteristic of the fiduciary 
relation is some measure of superiority, dominance, or control.”254 As the 
court saw it, the relationship among the YPO club members was “an equal 
relationship between peers” rather than a “relationship involving a degree of 
dominance.”255 Moreover, despite the government’s urging, the existence of 
an explicit confidentiality agreement did not sway the court’s decision. In 
the court’s view, “[t]he agreement may memorialize a moral and ethical 
duty that members undertake, but it does not create a legal one.”256
Rule 10b5-2 responded directly to what the SEC viewed as Chestman’s 
unduly narrow parameters and its failure to “sufficiently protect investors 
and the securities markets from the misappropriation and resulting misuse 
of inside information.”
 
257 Adopted in August 2000, the rule bears the 
caption, “Duties of trust or confidence in misappropriation theory cases.”258 
As its preliminary note explains, the rule provides a non-exclusive list of 
three situations in which a person has “a duty of trust or confidence” for 
purposes of the misappropriation theory.259
(1) when the person receiving the information “agrees to maintain 
[that] information in confidence”; 
 These three situations include: 
(2) when the persons involved in the communication “have a 
history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences” that results in a 
reasonable expectation of confidentiality; and 
 
 253. Id. at 1011. 
 254. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. 
 255. Id. at 1011–12. Although the court was correct in recognizing that Chestman referenced 
superiority, dominance, and control as characteristics of a fiduciary relationship, the Chestman 
court placed even greater emphasis on the fact that a fiduciary acts for “the benefit of another 
person, as to whom he stands in a relation implying and necessitating great confidence and 
trust on the one part and a high degree of good faith on the other part.” United States v. 
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568–69 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 
1979)). The facts in Kim, however, failed to demonstrate that the defendant received the 
confidential information for the benefit of another. See Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (observing 
that the communication of the confidential information “was completely gratuitous”). 
 256. Id. at 1013. For a case involving highly similar facts to those in Kim, but reaching 
precisely the opposite result, see SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147–50 (N.D. Ill. 2003) 
(member of a business roundtable owed a “duty of loyalty and confidentiality” to a fellow 
member where there was an “express policy and understanding that such [nonpublic business] 
matters were indeed to be kept confidential”). The decisions in Kim and Kirch are difficult to 
reconcile and evidence the lack of clarity and consistency that has characterized insider trading 
law in the decade since O’Hagan. 
 257. SEC Proposing Release, supra note 223, at 82,863. 
 258. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2008). 
 259. Id. at Preliminary Note. 
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(3) when the person receives such information from a spouse, 
parent, child or sibling, unless the person can show affirmatively, 
based on the particular facts and circumstances of that family 
relationship, that “he or she neither knew nor reasonably should 
have known that the person who was the source of the information 
expected that the person would keep the information 
confidential.”260
Accordingly, had Rule 10b5-2 been in place at the time of the defendants’ 
alleged violations, it may have changed the result in both Chestman and Kim: 
the husband–tipper in Chestman may have breached a duty owed to his wife 
pursuant to Rule 10b5-2(b)(3) and the defendant in Kim may have breached 
a duty owed to his fellow club member pursuant to Rule 10b-5(b)(1) and 
(2).
 
261
Rule 10b5-2 affects the legal landscape in even more profound ways. 
Indeed, both Rule 10b5-2’s caption and its preliminary note rephrase the 
Supreme Court’s requirement of a fiduciary or similar relationship of “trust 
and confidence”
 
262 to one of “trust or confidence.”263 This change from the 
conjunctive to the disjunctive extends the scope of the misappropriation 
theory considerably. To be sure, the terms “trust” and “confidence” are 
often used synonymously to describe reliance on the character or ability of 
someone to act in a right and proper way.264
 
 260. Id. at § 240.10b5-2(b)(1)–(3). According to the SEC, “Rule 10b5-2 addresses the issue 
of when a breach of a family or other non-business relationship may give rise to liability under 
the misappropriation theory.” SEC Adopting Release, supra note 
 But as used in Rule 10b5-2, the 
term “confidence” may align more with an obligation of “confidentiality” 
than with obligations predicated on trust and loyalty. O’Hagan, however, 
made clear that it is the insider trader’s undisclosed breach of trust and 
14, at 83,677. There is, 
however, nothing in the text of Rule 10b5-2 that forestalls its application to business 
relationships, and at least one court has made specific reference to the rule in that context. See 
SEC v. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d 477, 488–89 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (rejecting defendant’s claim 
that his prospective role as an estate and tax planner to two corporate executives did not carry 
with it a fiduciary-like obligation to keep confidential their discussions about upcoming 
acquisitions and buyouts). But see SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1061 n.91 (C.D. Cal. 
2006) (maintaining that “Rule 10b5-2 was not intended to apply to business relationships”), 
rev’d on other grounds, 530 F.3d 1085, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 261. There is, of course, the possibility that the courts would have ruled to invalidate Rule 
10b5-2 on the ground that it exceeded the SEC’s authority under Section 10(b). See infra note 
268 (citing Kim’s statement questioning the validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)); see also Ray J. 
Grzebielski, Friends, Family, Fiduciaries: Personal Relationships as a Basis for Insider Trading 
Violations, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 467, 492 (2002) (questioning whether Rule 10b5-2 is “outside of 
the SEC’s authority under Rule 10b-5”). 
 262. See supra note 50 (noting Chiarella’s repeated use of the phrase “trust and 
confidence”); note 98 (noting O’Hagan’s repeated use of the phrase “trust and confidence”). 
 263. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (emphasis added). 
 264. See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 275, 1268 (1990) (defining 
“confidence” as “faith or belief that one will act in a right, proper, or effective way” and “trust” 
as “assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something”). 
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loyalty—and not merely his breach of confidentiality—that constitutes the 
fraud under Rule 10b-5. As the Court stated, a “fiduciary who pretends 
loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal’s information 
for personal gain dupes or defrauds the principal.”265
The SEC’s expansion of liability under the misappropriation theory is 
most apparent in connection with Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), which encompasses 
situations in which “a person agrees to maintain information in 
confidence.”
 
266 This category dispenses entirely with the relational elements 
of trust and loyalty essential to O’Hagan’s reasoning. Thus, while Rule 10b5-
1’s second and third categories may substantially dilute fiduciary 
principles,267 the rule’s first category simply dispenses with those principles 
altogether.268
Consider, for example, recent insider trading enforcement actions 
initiated by the SEC in connection with so-called private investment in 
public equity (“PIPE”) transactions. A PIPE transaction is a form of stock 
offering often used by small public companies to raise a substantial amount 
of capital quickly. Those who purchase securities in these offerings do so 
expecting to resell their shares into the public trading markets after the 
issuer’s subsequent filing of a resale registration statement with the SEC. 
Such participants—often hedge funds—typically enter into private-
placement contracts that include a confidentiality agreement. In fact, 
confidentiality with respect to the PIPE transaction is necessary to preserve 
the issuer’s exemption from the Securities Act’s registration provisions.
 
269
Where the SEC believes a purchaser in a PIPE transaction has used its 
informational advantage to trade securities in the public markets (typically 
through the practice of short-selling), the SEC has not hesitated to bring 
charges of illegal insider trading. Most of these cases have settled, with the 
defendants consenting to injunctions under Section 10(b) and the payment 
 
 
 265. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997). 
 266. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1). 
 267. See David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White Collar 
Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1433–35 (2008) (discussing Rule 10b5-2 and observing that, based 
on the need to maintain the integrity of the markets, the rule extends “to cases in which there is 
no real fiduciary duty, in the sense that that term has been used over the years”). 
 268. See Grzebielski, supra note 261, at 492 (discussing Rule 10b5-2 and contending that 
“[a]n agreement to keep information confidential in an arm’s length negotiation establishes no 
fiduciary relationship or like relationship of trust and confidence”); D. Gordon Smith, The 
Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1422 (2002) (noting that 
“extending securities liability to any relationship where ‘a person agrees to maintain 
information in confidence’ extends the boundaries well beyond fiduciary relationships” 
(quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1)); see also United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1015 
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (“[A]n express agreement can provide the basis for misappropriation liability 
only if the express agreement sets forth a relationship with the hallmarks of a fiduciary 
relationship.”). 
 269. See Bruce Hiler et al., Enforcement Pipeline: Insider Trading, Unregistered Sales, and the 
Hedging of Private Investment in Public Equity, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 952 (June 18, 2007). 
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of disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and substantial penalties.270 To be 
sure, shorting the issuer’s stock can be quite profitable because the PIPE 
transaction has a dilutive effect on the value of the company’s existing 
shares. But one would be hard pressed to say that a purchaser in a PIPE 
transaction is “feigning fidelity” to the securities issuer when that purchaser 
also sells short the issuer’s shares. The typical relationship between the 
parties to a PIPE transaction is at arm’s-length,271 and an agreement not to 
share information with third parties is analytically distinct from a fiduciary 
obligation not to take advantage of that information in one’s personal 
securities trading over a stock exchange.272
 
 270. See SEC v. Ladin, Litigation Release No. 20,784, 2008 WL 4629527 (Oct. 20, 2008) 
(hedge fund analyst consented to a $700,000 payment, of which the analyst paid roughly 
$317,000, to settle charges that he caused his fund to short stock based on information 
pertaining to an upcoming PIPE transaction); SEC v. Deephaven Capital Mgmt., LLC & 
Lieberman, Litigation Release No. 19,683, 87 SEC Docket 2726 (May 2, 2006), available at 2006 
WL 1152605 (hedge fund adviser and portfolio manager consented to $5.8 million payment to 
settle charges including insider trading in 19 PIPE offerings); SEC v. Langley Partners, L.P., 
Litigation Release No. 19,607, 2006 WL 623053, at *2 (Mar. 14, 2006) (three hedge funds and 
their portfolio manager consented to a $16 million payment to settle allegations that included 
illegal insider trading in advance of the public announcement of seven PIPE transactions); SEC 
v. Shane, Litigation Release No. 19,227, 85 SEC Docket 1300 (May 18, 2005), available at 2005 
WL 1172243 (hedge fund manager agreed to pay more than $1 million to settle charges that 
she had shorted stock while under a specific agreement to keep a PIPE transaction 
confidential); see also SEC v. Pollet, Litigation Release No. 19,984, 2007 WL 257645, at *1 (Jan. 
29, 2007) (managing director of a broker–dealer consented to a $150,000 payment and a 
permanent bar from association with a broker–dealer to settle allegations that he sold short for 
proprietary accounts “the securities of ten public companies after receiving confidential non-
public information that these entities were either engaged in, or were contemplating engaging 
in, ‘PIPE’ financings”). In four of those transactions, the broker–dealer served as the PIPE 
issuers’ investment banker and was thus a “temporary insider” of the issuer. But, in the other six 
transactions, the broker–dealer was itself the purchaser in the private placement and thus stood 
in an arm’s-length relationship with the issuer. See Complaint at 1–2, Pollet, 2007 WL 257645, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp19984.pdf. 
 Accordingly, a confidentiality 
 271. See Hiler et al., supra note 269, at 957 (stating that PIPE transactions are “often the 
subject of vigorous negotiations involving, among other issues, the purchase price of the shares, 
the representations and warranties of the parties, and the anticipated registration of the shares” 
and that “[t]hese negotiations, and this arm’s length relationship often continue up to and 
through the date deals are signed, and even thereafter”). Cf. Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 
623 F.2d 796, 798 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that when two corporations’ management were “at all 
times responsible for different interests, and . . . had no relationship to each other before or 
other than in the acquisition discussions,” they “must be presumed to have dealt, absent 
evidence of an extraordinary relationship, at arm’s length”). 
 272. The SEC’s recent enforcement action against Mark Cuban, the high-profile owner of 
the NBA’s Dallas Mavericks franchise, charges insider trading in an instance where the recipient 
of PIPE-related information sold his stock in the issuer after declining an offer to purchase 
additional shares in the private placement. See Complaint ¶ 1, SEC v. Mark Cuban, Litigation 
Release No. 20,810 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/ 
2008/comp20810.pdf. According to the SEC’s complaint, the CEO of Momma.com had 
extracted from Cuban a promise of confidentiality prior to offering him an opportunity to 
participate in the PIPE transaction. See id. ¶¶ 12–14. Thus, in the SEC’s view, Cuban had 
“breached a duty of trust or confidence that he owed to Momma.com” when he later sold his 
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agreement, standing alone, should be insufficient to establish the requisite 
fiduciary-like relationship.273 Yet, at least two courts have accepted the SEC’s 
position that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) allows the prosecution of cases under the 
misappropriation theory based solely upon a trader’s agreement to maintain 
the confidentiality of a PIPE transaction.274
The highly publicized Goldman Sachs Treasury Desk trading scandal 
provides yet another example of the misappropriation theory’s extension to 
confidentiality agreements.
 
275 The material nonpublic information at issue 
involved the U.S. Department of Treasury’s announcement on October 31, 
2001 that it was suspending issuance of thirty-year bonds.276 Peter Davis, a 
political consultant hired by Goldman Sachs, learned of the suspension in a 
private press briefing where a Treasury official instructed the attendees that 
they were to embargo the announcement until 10:00 a.m. that morning.277
 
entire stake in the company (600,000 shares) on the basis of material nonpublic information 
concerning the upcoming PIPE offering. Id. ¶ 26. Cuban is contesting the SEC’s charges. See 
Kara Scannell & Leslie Eaton, Cuban Lays Out Defense to Insider-Trade Charges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
19, 2008, at C3 (reporting that Cuban claims there was “no agreement to keep information 
confidential”). The validity of Rule 10b5-2’s “trust or confidence” phraseology may well become 
an important issue in the litigation. 
 
According to the government, many years earlier, Davis had agreed 
 273. See Paul v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that “the 
mere existence of a contract does not create a fiduciary duty”; but that a plaintiff must show 
that the parties “extended their relationship beyond the limits of the contractual obligations to 
a relationship founded upon trust and confidence”); Steele v. Isikoff, 130 F. Supp. 2d 23, 36 
(D.D.C. 2000) (“[T]he mere existence of a contractual relationship is ordinarily insufficient to 
give rise to a fiduciary duty.”); Church of Scientology Int’l v. Eli Lilly & Co., 848 F. Supp. 1018, 
1028 (D.D.C. 1994) (“[W]hether there exists a fiduciary relationship is a fact-intensive question, 
involving a searching inquiry into the nature of the relationship, the promises made, the type of 
services or advice given and the legitimate expectations of the parties.”). 
 274. SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (emphasizing the complaint’s 
allegations that the private-placement materials “required investors to keep the information 
conveyed in connection with [PIPE] offerings confidential” and refusing to dismiss charges of 
insider trading because the SEC alleged specific facts “that plausibly support its claim that a 
confidential relationship arose between defendants and those four PIPE issuers”). In SEC v. 
Mangan, 598 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733 (W.D.N.C. 2008), the district court initially denied 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the SEC’s charges that the defendant had violated Rule 10b-5 by 
short selling stock while aware of the PIPE transaction. However, the court subsequently 
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that under the facts of the 
case, the information about the PIPE transaction was immaterial as a matter of law. Id. at 737. 
Moreover, in SEC v. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d 477, 489–90 (N.D. Tex. 2005), the court cited 
Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) and refused to dismiss insider trading charges, in part because the SEC’s 
complaint cited memoranda evidencing defendant’s agreement to keep the relevant 
information confidential. 
 275. See generally SEC v. Davis, Litigation Release No. 18,322, 81 SEC Docket 2952 (Sept. 4, 
2003), available at 2003 WL 23303550 (outlining the Treasury Desk trading scandal); Gregory 
Zuckerman, Goldman Says It Got Early Word of Plan to End Sale of Long Bond, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 
2001, at C1 (same). 
 276. Davis, 81 SEC Docket 2952. 
 277. Id. 
A4 - NAGY_INITIAL 5/31/2009 7:50 PM 
1364 94  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2009] 
explicitly that he would preserve the confidentiality of any embargoed 
information learned through his attendance at press conferences.278 Yet, at 
9:35 a.m., Davis shared this information with John Youngdahl, a Senior 
Economist in Goldman’s Global Economics Group.279 Youngdahl then 
informed several traders at Goldman’s Treasury Desk, who acted quickly to 
purchase $84 million in thirty-year bonds for the firm’s proprietary 
account.280 Both Youngdahl and Davis pled guilty to criminal insider trading 
charges,281 and the SEC obtained settlements resulting in injunctive relief 
and substantial monetary penalties.282 The SEC also entered into a 
settlement with Goldman Sachs whereby the firm agreed to a censure and 
the payment of almost $10 million in disgorgement, prejudgment interest, 
and civil penalties.283
Rule 10b5-2’s extension of the misappropriation theory to breaches of a 
confidentiality agreement has contributed to the demise of fiduciary 
principles in the law of insider trading. And while O’Hagan’s policy 
justifications may support liability for the wrongful use of such confidential 
information, O’Hagan’s fiduciary-based framework militates against it. 
 
IV. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE 
The analysis in Parts II and III of this Article reveals an insider trading 
jurisprudence that has shifted almost full circle: starting as one where 
unequal access to information triggered a disclosure obligation under Rule 
 
 278. Id. 
 279. Kip Betz, Ex-Goldman VP Given 33 Months in Insider Trading Case Over Long-Bond Tip, 36 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 709, 709 (2004). 
 280. Davis, 81 SEC Docket 2952. 
 281. See Betz, supra note 279 (reporting Youngdahl’s sentencing). 
 282. See Davis, 81 SEC Docket 2952 (announcing Davis’s agreement to pay $149,598 in 
disgorgement and penalties); SEC v. Davis, Litigation Release No. 18,453, 81 SEC Docket 1938 
(Nov. 12, 2003), available at 2003 WL 22671043 (announcing Youngdahl’s agreement to pay a 
penalty of $240,000). 
 283. See Davis, 81 SEC Docket 2952. In a related enforcement action, the SEC has alleged 
that Davis also shared material nonpublic information about the Treasury’s bond suspension 
with Joseph Nothern, a bond portfolio manager for MFS Investment Management in Boston, 
Massachusetts. In re Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2165, 80 SEC 
Docket 2940 (Sept. 4, 2003), available at 2003 WL 22056989. Although MFS agreed to a 
settlement with the SEC, see id., Nothern is litigating the Rule 10b-5 charges filed against him. 
See SEC v. Nothern, 400 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (D. Mass. 2005) (granting SEC’s motion to strike 
defendant’s affirmative defense of estoppel). Nothern has filed a motion for summary 
judgment based on a number of grounds, including that Davis did not owe a fiduciary duty to 
the Treasury Department, even if Davis had promised confidentiality as a precondition to his 
access to the briefing. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of His Motion for Summary 
Judgment, SEC v. Nothern, 400 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D. Mass. 2005) (No. 105CV10983), 2008 WL 
3342729. Nothern is also challenging the validity of Rule 10b5-2 insofar as the rule expands the 
fiduciary parameters set out in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan. See id. (maintaining that “the SEC 
lacks the power to interpret Rule 10b-5 in a manner inconsistent with the language of § 10(b) 
itself”). 
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10b-5; then to one where the disclosure obligation was predicated on a 
fiduciary relationship between the parties to the securities transaction; next 
to one where the disclosure obligation was predicated on either a fiduciary 
relationship between the trading parties or between the trader–tipper and 
the source of the information; and finally, to one where the Rule 10b-5 
violation now often turns on the wrongful use of material nonpublic 
information, regardless of whether a fiduciary-like duty has been breached. 
This latest jurisprudential shift has occurred in the wake of O’Hagan and is 
reflected in lower court decisions and SEC settlements imposing Rule 10b-5 
liability outside of the “deception by a fiduciary” paradigm as well as in 
decisions holding that it is the insider’s affirmative use of material nonpublic 
information, and not merely the possession of such information, that 
violates Rule 10b-5. The latest shift is further evidenced by Rule 10b5-1’s 
affirmative defenses for insiders with “pre-existing” trading plans and Rule 
10b5-2’s application to persons who merely agree to maintain the 
confidentiality of shared information. 
The insider trading law that has evolved over the last decade promotes 
the policy objectives highlighted in the Supreme Court’s decisions: it 
prevents insiders from “exploiting [the corporation’s] information for their 
personal gain,”284 and it fosters “investor confidence” and “market integrity” 
by ensuring that both insiders and outsiders are unable “to capitalize on 
nonpublic information through the purchase or sale of securities.”285
The final part of this Article proposes three alternatives to the 
hodgepodge of theories, rules, and decisions that form the basis of today’s 
insider trading law. First, Congress could disentangle the offense of insider 
trading from Rule 10b-5 and define the conduct that would be subject to 
prosecution. Second, courts could reach beyond O’Hagan and explicitly 
recognize Rule 10b-5 liability in instances where material nonpublic 
information has been acquired deceptively, regardless of whether the trader 
and the source had a fiduciary-like relationship. A third possibility would be 
for courts to embrace a “fraud on investors” theory similar to the one 
proposed by Chief Justice Burger in his Chiarella dissent. Under such a 
theory, Rule 10b-5 liability for insider trading would turn on whether a 
securities trader failed to disclose to investors wrongfully obtained material 
nonpublic information. Although a statutory definition would be the best 
alternative, judicial acceptance of alternative theories of Rule 10b-5 liability 
 
However, the lack of a clear and consistent theory of insider trading liability 
compromises the government’s ability to achieve these objectives in 
prosecutions that fall outside of the “deception by a fiduciary” paradigm. 
The contradictions and confusion in the jurisprudential landscape also 
make Rule 10b5-1 and Rule 10b5-2 vulnerable to challenge in litigation. 
 
 284. SEC v. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
 285. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
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would at least move the law of insider trading in a more positive and 
consistent direction. 
A. A STATUTORY DEFINITION FOR INSIDER TRADING 
Unlike the explicit statutory prohibitions against insider trading that 
exist in most other countries with developed securities markets,286 the law of 
insider trading in the United States is essentially judge-made, turning on 
whether such trading is deceptive under Rule 10b-5. Although a direct 
federal prohibition could take any number of forms,287
Ironically, the prohibition of securities trading based on wrongfully 
obtained information almost became law in the late 1980s when Congress 
was seeking to toughen the regulation and enforcement of insider 
trading.
 the form that would 
best reflect the outcomes in recent cases, as well as the affirmative defenses 
and prohibition set forth in SEC rules, would be a statute prohibiting 
securities transactions based on “wrongfully obtained information.” 
288 In fact, Congress considered a statutory prohibition in 
connection with two monumental legislative efforts: the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984 (“ITSA”),289 which authorized the SEC to seek court-
ordered civil monetary penalties of up to “three times the profit gained or 
loss avoided” from illegal trading or tipping;290 and the Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (“ITSFEA”),291 which extended 
ITSA’s civil penalty provision to “controlling persons”292 and provided 
contemporaneous traders with an express private right of action for illegal 
tipping or trading.293
 
 286. See Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading Regulation—A Comparative Analysis, 37 INT’L LAW. 
153, 162 (2003) (“[C]ountries abroad have adopted detailed and specific legislation defining 
the parameters of the insider trading proscription.”). 
 ITSFEA also raised the maximum criminal penalties 
for willful violations of Exchange Act provisions and rules from a fine of 
$100,000 and/or five years in prison, to a fine of $1 million and/or ten years 
 287. See Painter et al., supra note 35, at 221–23 (discussing a host of legislative proposals, 
including an “equality of access” approach advocated by Professor Joel Seligman; a “ban on 
trading based on ‘unerodable informational advantages,’” as recommended by Professor Victor 
Brudney; and an approach that “focuses on the duties of insiders to the market,” as 
recommended by Professor Jill Fisch. 
 288. See generally Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in 
the 1980s, 82 IND. L.J. 575 (2007). 
 289. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 290. Exchange Act § 21A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a) (2000). 
 291. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 
102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78). 
 292. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(b)(1). Pursuant to this provision, the SEC, under specified 
circumstances, may seek a penalty against a person who, “at the time of the violation, directly or 
indirectly controlled the person who committed such violation.” Id. § 78u-1(a)(1)(B). 
 293. Id. § 78t-1. 
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in prison.294 Rather than expressly prohibiting the offense of insider 
trading, Congress, on both occasions, merely enhanced the penalties 
without defining the conduct.295
Much could be gained, however, from dusting off ITSA and ITSFEA’s 
legislative history, and in particular, Senate Bill 1380, a proposed bill 
entitled the “Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987.”
 
296 Senate Bill 1380 
was introduced by Senators Donald Riegle and Alfonse D’Amato based on 
recommendations by a committee of securities-law practitioners headed by 
Harvey Pitt,297 who many years later became Chair of the SEC. The bill, as it 
was later reconciled with alternative versions submitted by the SEC,298
[F]or any person, directly or indirectly, to purchase, sell or cause 
the purchase or sale of, any security, while in possession of 
material, nonpublic information relating thereto (or relating to the 
market therefor), if such person knows (or recklessly disregards) 
that such information has been obtained wrongfully, or that such 
purchase or sale would constitute a wrongful use of such 
information.
 
proposed adding a new Section 16A to the Exchange Act, making it 
unlawful: 
299
 
 294. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act § 4. The legislative history 
reveals that the increase in “the maximum jail term is an explicit congressional statement of the 
heightened seriousness with which insider trading and other securities fraud offenses should be 
viewed,” and that Congress “expects that raising the ceiling will increase the certainty of 
substantial prison sentences.” ITSFEA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 
 
117, at 18. In 2002, these 
maximum criminal penalties were again increased with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1106, 116 Stat. 745, and Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78ff(a), currently provides for fines of not more than $5 million and/or imprisonment 
of not more than twenty years. See supra note 29. 
 295. See NAGY ET AL., supra note 28, at 519, 521 (noting that through “artful wording,” the 
civil penalty provisions in Section 21A and the express private right of action in Section 20A 
apply to persons who are found to have violated the Exchange Act or any rule thereunder by 
“purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information”). 
 296. S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in FERRARA ET AL., supra note 36, app. 
C. 
 297. Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look at the Next 
Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 227–28 (1990). 
 298. To be sure, the SEC had long opposed any effort to enact a statutory prohibition of 
insider trading. See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 14 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2287 
(emphasizing the SEC recommendation that “any effort to define insider trading would result 
in . . . a rule that leaves gaping holes”). But in the latter half of 1987, the SEC grudgingly 
endorsed a legislative effort, in part because it feared that the Supreme Court would reject the 
misappropriation theory that had been embraced by the Second Circuit. See FERRARA ET AL., 
supra note 36, app. D, at 6–14 (reprinting the SEC’s initial proposal); see also Roberta S. Karmel, 
Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 
100 (1998) (describing the SEC’s fluctuating opposition to a statutory definition). 
 299. S. 1390 (“Reconciliation Draft,” dated November 19, 1987), reprinted in Symposium: 
Defining Insider Trading, Appendix, 39 ALA. L. REV. 337 app. at 554 (1988). 
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The reconciled version of Senate Bill 1380 would have further provided that: 
For the purposes of this subsection, such trading while in 
possession of material, nonpublic information is wrongful only if 
such information has been obtained by, or its use would constitute, 
directly or indirectly, (A) theft, bribery, misrepresentation, 
espionage (through electronic or other means) or (B) conversion, 
misappropriation, or a breach of any fiduciary duty, any personal 
or other relationship of trust and confidence, or any contractual or 
employment relationship.300
Congress, however, ultimately decided against any direct statutory 
prohibition because, in its view, “the court-drawn parameters of insider 
trading have established clear guidelines for the vast majority of traditional 
insider trading cases, and . . . a statutory definition could potentially be 
narrowing, and in an unintended manner facilitate schemes to evade the 
law.”
 
301
The statutory prohibition in Senate Bill 1380 is generally viewed as a 
relic of history. Yet it is striking how closely that prohibition aligns with the 
jurisprudence—or at least the results—in the litigated cases and SEC 
settlements discussed in Part III. The statutory proposal is also consistent 
with Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2. In many ways, then, Congress attained what it 
sought in deflecting the definitional issue to the SEC and the courts. 
Congress’s evasiveness, however, has come at the cost of clarity, consistency, 
and legitimacy. 
 
If Congress believes that insider trading is an offense that merits 
substantial monetary penalties and stiff prison sentences—and the penalty 
provisions in ITSA and ITSFEA confirm that it does—then it should 
confront the definitional issue head on, with the proposal in Senate Bill 
1380 as a logical starting place. As one of Senate Bill 1380’s sponsors once 
emphasized, the “‘I know it when I see it standard’ is totally 
unacceptable.”302
 
 300. Id. 
 That indictment was valid in 1988, and it continues to ring 
true today as courts and the SEC struggle to apply the classical and 
misappropriation theories to conduct that lies outside of the “deception by a 
fiduciary” paradigm. 
 301. ITSFEA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 117, at 11. However, had the Supreme Court 
rejected the validity of the misappropriation theory in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 
(1987), see supra note 86, Congress likely would have been dissatisfied with the “court-drawn” 
parameters, and Senate Bill 1380 may well have been enacted into law. See Joo, supra note 288, 
at 612 (maintaining that the “perceived need” for Senate Bill 1380 abated “when the Supreme 
Court decided Carpenter late in 1987”). 
 302. 133 CONG. REC. 16,393 (1987) (statement of Sen. Alfonse D’Amato). 
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B. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF INSIDER TRADING UNDER RULE 10b-5 
Notwithstanding periodic rumblings from members of Congress,303
1. Rule 10b-5 Liability Premised on the Deceptive Acquisition of 
Confidential Information 
 the 
likelihood of a statutory prohibition of insider trading is remote. The 
offense of insider trading has long been viewed as a species of fraud under 
Rule 10b-5, and in the absence of a Supreme Court decision reinvigorating 
the fiduciary limitations in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan, Congress will likely 
remain content with the results reached by lower courts and the SEC, at least 
in the aggregate. Thus, the practical challenge going forward lies with 
devising a theory of insider trading liability where the deceptive breach of a 
fiduciary duty is no longer essential to the finding of fraud under Rule 10b-
5. 
One way to add a modicum of clarity and consistency to the law of 
insider trading would be for courts to embrace a new theory premised on 
the deceptive acquisition of confidential information. This new theory of 
insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5 could function as a third 
alternative to the classical and misappropriation approaches. To be sure, the 
First Circuit started down this road in SEC v. Rocklage,304 but the Rocklage 
court failed to make clear that a theory of deceptive acquisition is 
analytically distinct from the misappropriation theory endorsed in 
O’Hagan.305 Indeed, a theory of deceptive acquisition could support liability 
in any case where confidential information was acquired through deceptive 
means, even in the absence of a fiduciary-like relationship between the 
trader and the source. Such a theory has firm roots in the text of Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which extend broadly to encompass all deceptive 
devices and contrivances used in connection with securities trading. And 
while fiduciary principles have been central to the Supreme Court’s view of 
Rule 10b-5 liability for insider trading, the plain language of Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 command no such limitation.306
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners, 
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.
 
307
 
 303. See Richard Hill, Hedge Funds, Senior Senators Take Shots at the SEC, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 2050 (Dec. 11, 2006) (reporting that Senator Arlen Specter was preparing a bill 
that would seek to prohibit insider trading directly). 
 provides compelling support for a new theory 
 304. SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 305. See supra text accompanying notes 174–177. 
 306. See Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Remarks Before the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2008 Summer School: 
U.S. Experience of Insider Trading Enforcement (Feb. 19, 2008), available at http://sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2008/spch021908lct.htm (emphasizing that “duty is not what the statute requires. 
Duty is a subset of the statutory requirement of deception”). 
 307. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
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of insider trading liability premised on the deceptive acquisition of 
confidential information. The Court in Stoneridge reviewed a decision by the 
Eighth Circuit, which narrowly construed Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to 
apply only to “‘misstatements, omissions by one who has a duty to disclose, 
and manipulative trading practices.’”308 The Supreme Court, however, 
unanimously rejected this construction, with both the majority and the 
dissenting Justices in agreement that “[c]onduct itself can be deceptive” 
under Section 10(b).309
A theory of “deceptive acquisition” would plug a few of the gaps left 
open by the fiduciary-based theories of insider trading liability previously 
endorsed by the Supreme Court. First, the theory could provide for liability 
in certain misappropriation cases where the securities trader lacks any pre-
existing relationship with the source of the information, such as securities 
trading based on hacked information. Hacking into a computer to obtain 
information for securities trading typically involves acts that may be viewed 
as “deceptive.” As the SEC has argued, computer hackers employ 
“‘electronic means to trick, circumvent, or bypass computer security in order 
to gain unauthorized access to computer systems, networks, and information 
stored or communicated therein, and to steal such data.’”
 Stoneridge therefore affirms the government’s ability 
to pursue defendants who engage in deceptive conduct in connection with 
securities trading, even if that conduct does not involve misstatements or 
omissions by one who has a fiduciary-like duty to disclose. 
310 Moreover, 
federal law characterizes computer hacking as “fraud,” and an act of fraud 
necessarily involves an act of deception.311 Although it is the computer 
system or network that permits the unauthorized access,312
 
 308. Id. at 769 (quoting In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th 
Cir. 2006)). 
 the computer is a 
mere conduit in the deceptive scheme that a hacker perpetrates on the 
 309. Id. at 769, 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Eighth Circuit’s holding as 
“incorrect,” and noting that the Court “correctly explains why the statute covers nonverbal as 
well as verbal deceptive conduct”). 
 310. SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 07 Civ. 9606, 2008 WL 126612, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2008) 
(quoting the Posthearing Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and other Equitable Relief and in Opposition 
to Defendant Dorozhko’s Motion to Dismiss at 9, Dorozhko, 2008 WL 126612 (No. 
107CV09606)). 
 311. Id. (noting the SEC’s citation to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030(a)(4) (2000), which provides that whoever “knowingly and with intent to defraud, 
accesses” a computer covered by the Act “without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, 
and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value” shall 
be subject to punishment as provided for in the Act). 
 312. See Floyd Norris, Make Big Profits Illegally (and Maybe Keep Them, Too), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
15, 2008, at C1 (reporting a question posed by Second Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor during 
the SEC’s successful oral argument on its motion to stay the district judge’s decision to lift the 
asset freeze). 
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corporation whose security system he breaches.313
As we have seen, arguments based on a defendant’s “deceptive 
acquisition” of confidential information have been met with mixed success 
in SEC prosecutions against alleged computer hackers for insider trading.
 And the hacker’s 
deception would be “in connection with” the subsequent securities 
transactions because the hacking and the purchases of the issuer’s stock are 
part of a single scheme, which is not complete until the securities purchases 
are made. 
314 
Although the SEC obtained the relief it requested in two cases,315 a district 
court rejected the SEC’s position in the third computer-hacker case, and the 
case is now under consideration by the Second Circuit.316 But the district 
court lacked the benefit of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Stoneridge, and 
its view that “a breach of a fiduciary duty of disclosure is a required element 
of any ‘deceptive’ device under § 10(b)” was precisely the view that all of the 
Justices rejected in Stoneridge.317
In addition to securities trading based on hacked information, the 
“deceptive acquisition” theory could extend Rule 10b-5 liability to other 
scenarios in which a person obtains confidential information through lies or 
other means of trickery, regardless of the existence of a fiduciary-like 
relationship. The deceptive acquisition theory thus provides a justification 
for the results reached in some of the litigated cases and SEC settlements 
discussed in Part III. Consider, for example, a friend who “dupes” another 
into revealing material nonpublic information that he then uses in a 
securities transaction. This scenario may well be what the Seventh Circuit 
had in mind in United States v. Evans
 
318
 
 313. See United States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming defendant’s 
conviction for federal mail fraud and wire fraud, and holding that every time the defendant had 
used his improperly retained key card to gain entry into the bank that formerly employed him, 
the defendant “in effect, falsely represented that he was a bank employee entitled to be in the 
bank”). Cherif’s unlawful entry enabled his misappropriation of material nonpublic 
information pertaining to the bank’s clients, which he then used to trade securities. Id. The 
court thus regarded the electronic device reading Cherif’s key card as a conduit in the 
deceptive scheme that defrauded the bank. Id. The SEC also brought civil charges under Rule 
10b-5 against Cherif for insider trading. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 405 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(affirming the district court’s preliminary injunction against Cherif). The decision, however, 
rested on the court’s conclusion that as a former employee, Cherif continued to owe the bank 
fiduciary duties, even after the bank terminated his employment. See id. at 411–12. 
 when it upheld the tippee’s criminal 
 314. See supra notes 147–156 and accompanying text. 
 315. SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, Litigation Release No. 20,134, 2007 WL 1574065 
(May 31, 2007); SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd. & Stokes (Blue Bottle Lit. Rel. II), Litigation Release No. 
20,095, 2007 WL 1238669 (Apr. 27, 2007). 
 316. See SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 07 Civ. 9606, 2008 WL 126612, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2008) 
(discussed supra text accompanying notes 142–156). 
 317. Id. at *8. 
 318. United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 316, 323 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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conviction notwithstanding the previous acquittal of his tipper–friend.319 
Moreover, as we saw in Rocklage,320 a wife deceptively acquires information 
from her husband when she fails to reveal a prior agreement to share his 
company’s information with her brother.321 Another example of “deceptive 
acquisition” is one suggested by Professor Donald Langevoort, who 
hypothesizes a situation in which a person tricks another into leaving a 
business meeting in order to access confidential file folders left on the 
table.322 Cybersnoops may also incur liability under this theory if they gained 
access to the computer through deception.323
Yet, a theory of insider trading liability premised on the deceptive 
acquisition of confidential information has its own limitations, and thus 
some of the gaps left open by the Court’s fiduciary-based theories will 
remain. One can imagine any number of scenarios where a trader obtains 
confidential information through outright theft, but where the theft is 
accomplished without any act of deception. Had a passing stranger stolen 
the papers in Professor Langevoort’s example while the owner had left the 
room to take a phone call, the information would not have been 
“deceptively acquired.” Had the owner been held up at gunpoint and 
robbed of the papers, the information would not have been deceptively 
acquired. Moreover, the deceptive acquisition theory would not extend to 
Rule 10b5-2 cases involving the breach of a confidentiality agreement, unless 
a defendant harbored an intent to breach the agreement at the time the 
confidential information was acquired.
 
324
The deceptive acquisition theory is also vulnerable to the criticism 
repeatedly lodged by many scholars at the misappropriation theory 
endorsed in O’Hagan: that the theory is pretextual because it allows Rule 
10b-5 to “catch” unfairness to investors without having to characterize that 
unfairness as fraud.
 Such hyper-factual distinctions are 
necessary because the theory turns on the deceptive means by which 
confidential information is acquired. 
325
 
 319. See supra text accompanying notes 
 Under both theories, the sources of the 
193–194 (discussing the court’s reference to an 
insider who is “duped into breaching her duty of confidentiality”). 
 320. SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 321. Supra text accompanying notes 174–177. 
 322. See LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING, supra note 14, § 6:14. 
 323. See supra text accompanying notes 147–152 (discussing the SEC’s case against 
cybersnoops). 
 324. Cf. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int’l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 597 (2001) 
(holding that a secret intention not to honor securities options amounted to deceit in 
connection with the sale of the options). 
 325. See Nagy, supra note 23, at 1275–76; see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and 
Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 
471–72 (2001) (noting that “it has been argued that the misappropriation theory, explicitly 
adopted by the Supreme Court in O’Hagan, is a mere pretext by the Commission, with the 
concurrence of the federal courts, to evade Chiarella’s limitations). 
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information—and not securities investors—are deceived by the defendant’s 
conduct. Yet, under both theories, it is insider trading’s impact on the 
securities market and the confidence of investors that provides the rationale 
for the Rule 10b-5 prohibition. 
The charge of pretext can be avoided if courts were to recognize that a 
fraud on investors occurs when wrongfully obtained information is used in a 
securities transaction. Moreover, as compared with the classical and 
misappropriation theories, or with an approach based on a defendant’s 
deceptive acquisition of information, the “fraud on investors” theory would 
encompass a broader range of cases. 
2. Rule 10b-5 Liability Premised on a “Fraud on Investors” 
In the absence of an express statutory prohibition, Chief Justice 
Burger’s “fraud on investors” theory of Rule 10b-5 liability provides a starting 
point for the best approach to the problem of insider trading.326 Like the 
other members of the Chiarella Court, Chief Justice Burger focused his Rule 
10b-5 analysis on the propriety of a trader’s silence about material nonpublic 
information in a securities transaction.327 But unlike the majority in 
Chiarella, the Chief Justice did not regard the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship as essential to the duty to speak.328 Rather, in his view, a duty to 
speak could arise any time that a securities trader used an informational 
advantage obtained through misappropriation.329
To support his view that Rule 10b-5 imposes liability for a securities 
trader’s silence about unlawfully obtained information, Chief Justice Burger 
looked to the common law. Specifically, he quoted the distinguished torts 
scholar Professor Page Keeton, who had long before observed that “‘[a]ny 
time information is acquired by . . . an illegal act it would seem that there 
should be a duty to disclose that information.’”
 Thus, under Chief Justice 
Burger’s theory, the marketplace traders harmed by Chiarella’s insider 
trading were also the parties defrauded under Rule 10b-5. 
330
 
 326. See Langevoort, supra note 
 The Chief Justice read 
Rule 10b-5 to encompass and build upon this duty, concluding that “a 
19, at 883 (expressing a preference for a Rule 10b-5 theory 
based on “a duty to disclose misappropriated information to other marketplace traders”); Nagy, 
supra note 23, at 1287–1310. 
 327. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I 
would read § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to encompass and build on this principle: to mean that a 
person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that 
information or to refrain from trading.”). 
 328. Id. (“[The] provisions [of Rule 10b-5] reach any person engaged in any fraudulent 
scheme.”). 
 329. Id. (maintaining that the common-law rule of caveat emptor did not apply in instances 
where “an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or 
industry, but by some unlawful means”). 
 330. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Page W. Keeton, Fraud—Concealment and Non-
Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1936)). 
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person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute 
duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading.”331
My prior research on disclosure duties under the common law bolsters 
the analysis in the Chief Justice’s dissent.
 
332 At least two courts have 
explicitly recognized a duty to disclose wrongfully obtained information,333 
and the duty is reflected in an illustration to the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts.334 A duty to disclose wrongfully obtained information also 
reinforces the common law’s concerns with economic efficiency. That is, 
unlike a “parity of information” rule, which could operate to discourage 
diligent research and legitimate searches for information, a duty to disclose 
wrongfully obtained information disallows only those informational 
advantages that serve “no useful function except [the trader’s] own 
enrichment at the expense of others.”335 The sparseness of case law 
supporting the duty to disclose wrongfully obtained information should not 
be surprising. As scholars have argued recently, such cases may settle early in 
the litigation process because the defendants are “unsympathetic (having 
violated the law or committed a tort). . . . [and] might fear that courts will 
treat them more harshly.”336
Recent Supreme Court decisions reveal conflicting views concerning 
the role of common law in shaping the elements of claims based on Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In the Stoneridge case decided just last term, five 
Justices subscribed to the view that “Section 10(b) does not incorporate 
common-law fraud into federal law.”
 
337
 
 331. Id. at 237 n.21 (citation omitted). 
 Yet, only three terms before, in Dura 
 332. See Nagy, supra note 23, at 1288–96. 
 333. See id. at 1290–93 (discussing Mallon Oil Co. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 965 P.2d 105 
(Colo. 1998) and the British case of Phillips v. Homfray, 6 Ch. App. 770 (1871)). The 
transactions at issue in both Mallon Oil and Phillips involved real estate where the buyer 
obtained an informational advantage through an illegal trespass on the seller’s property. See id. 
at 1290–91. 
 334. See id. at 1290 n.317 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 illus. 11 
(1979)). Illustration 11 provides that “[Buyer] A learns of [the] valuable mineral deposits from 
trespassing on [vendor] B’s land . . . . A’s non-disclosure is equivalent to an assertion that the 
land does not contain valuable mineral deposits, and this assertion is a misrepresentation.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 illus. 11 (1979). 
 335. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 241 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See 
Nagy, supra note 23, at 1294 (discussing the work of Professor Anthony Kronman); see also John 
F. Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1364 (1981) 
(maintaining that “[a] privilege to exploit information improperly obtained would reduce the 
incentive to invest in legitimate information production by exacerbating free rider problems 
and by placing on producers the risk of misappropriation” and that “[l]ess information would 
be produced, because at least some producers would shift resources from additional production 
to theft of what others have produced”). 
 336. Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of 
Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1862 (2005). 
 337. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 771 (2008). 
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,338 a unanimous Court looked to the common 
law to support its conclusion that private Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs must prove 
economic loss in order to recover damages.339 Moreover, in three decisions 
issued in the 1980s, the Court seemed to view the common law as a 
foundation for Rule 10b-5 liability that should be expanded to heighten the 
protection available to those who purchase and sell securities.340
The government has several strong policy arguments in support of an 
insider trading theory based on “fraud on investors.” First, the theory avoids 
the charge of pretext that critics have lodged at O’Hagan’s “fraud on the 
source” misappropriation theory and would likely lodge at a theory of 
“deceptive acquisition.”
 These 
somewhat mixed messages suggest that the current Court would view 
common-law support for a duty to disclose wrongfully obtained information 
as a necessary, rather than a sufficient, condition for the viability of a “fraud 
on investors” theory of Rule 10b-5 liability. That is, in addition to having a 
valid doctrinal basis, for the “fraud on investors” theory to be accepted, the 
theory must also make sense as a matter of policy. 
341 Indeed, because the violation at issue involves the 
deception of the investors on the other side of the securities transaction, the 
conduct prohibited is precisely the type of conduct that Congress intended 
Section 10(b) to reach.342 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, 
“[d]efrauded investors are among the very individuals Congress sought to 
protect in the securities laws.”343
 
 338. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 
 339. Id. at 343–44 (stating that “the common law has long insisted that a plaintiff in [an 
action for deceit] show not only that had he known the truth he would not have acted but also 
that he suffered actual economic loss”). See generally Jill Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and 
Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811 (2009) (examining common-law principles 
enumerated in Dura and their applicability to federal securities fraud); Robert B. Thompson, 
Federal Corporate Law: Torts and Fiduciary Duty, 31 J. CORP. L. 877, 887 (2006) (discussing the 
implications of expanding tort law to securities fraud). 
 340. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244, n.22 (1988) (stating that “[a]ctions under 
Rule 10b-5 are distinct from common-law deceit and misrepresentation claims . . . and are in 
part designed to add to the protections provided investors by the common law”); Herman & 
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (stating that “an important purpose of the 
federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law 
protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities industry”); see also 
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (stating that the Court 
has “eschewed rigid common-law barriers in construing the securities laws”). See generally 
Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be 
Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96 (1985) (examining common-law principles of justifiable 
reliance in the context of Rule 10b-5 liability). 
 341. See supra note 325. 
 342. See Nagy, supra note 23, at 1300–04 (arguing that the “fraud on investors” approach is 
better suited toward the policy objectives of Rule 10b-5); see also Langevoort, supra note 19, at 
883 (noting that the theory keeps the fraud “legitimately within the zone normally associated 
with Rule 10b-5”). 
 343. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 390. 
A4 - NAGY_INITIAL 5/31/2009 7:50 PM 
1376 94  IOWA LAW REVIEW [2009] 
Second, because the theory’s disclosure duty applies only to wrongfully 
obtained information, judicial acceptance of the “fraud on investors” theory 
would not discourage diligent research or other legitimate methods of 
uncovering material nonpublic information. To be sure, Dirks’s “personal 
benefit” requirement was created in part to preclude interference with the 
role of securities analysts.344 But under a “fraud on investors” theory, 
securities analysts and other market participants could continue to “ferret 
out and analyze information.”345
Finally, the “fraud on investors” theory is better aligned with the Court’s 
policy justifications for the federal insider trading prohibition and more 
accurately describes what courts actually do when they decide insider trading 
cases. The theory protects “the integrity of the securities markets against 
abuses by ‘outsiders’”
 
346 and “promote[s] investor confidence.”347
For all of these reasons, the government has much to gain by advancing 
a “fraud on investors” theory in insider trading cases that do not fit squarely 
into O’Hagan’s “deception by a fiduciary” paradigm. Although lower courts 
may be reluctant to reframe insider trading liability along these lines, 
persistent advocacy by the SEC may serve to overcome such reluctance. 
Moreover, given the lack of clarity and consistency under current law, the 
Supreme Court is bound to confront the issue of Rule 10b-5 liability in 
insider trading cases in the future. 
 
Furthermore, because it applies to all securities transactions based on 
wrongfully obtained information, the “fraud on investors” theory captures a 
broader range of conduct than do theories based on either “fraud on the 
source” or “deception acquisition.” In capturing this broader range of 
conduct, the theory is better aligned with the results in the litigated cases 
and settled proceedings discussed in Part III. 
In the context of an insider trading prosecution by the government, the 
Supreme Court may well be amenable toward accepting a “fraud on 
investors” theory. Although the Court has been openly hostile to a broad 
reading of Rule 10b-5 in private securities litigation,348
 
 344. See supra text accompanying note 
 it has embraced the 
63 (discussing the chilling effect of a broad 
prohibition and citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1982)). 
 345. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658. Securities analysts and other investment professionals, however, 
now operate in the wake of Regulation FD, which effectively prohibits public companies and 
their insiders from selectively disclosing material information that has not been shared with the 
general public. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)–(b)(1) (2008). 
 346. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997) (citation omitted). 
 347. Id. at 658 (emphasizing that “investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in 
a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by 
law”). 
 348. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 779 (2008) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A theme that underlies the Court’s analysis is its mistaken hostility 
towards the § 10(b) private cause of action.”); see also Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, 
The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1642 (2004) (noting 
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opposite reading when the government has urged the Court to preserve the 
government’s enforcement authority.349 O’Hagan provides a compelling 
illustration: strong deference to the government’s claim of broad 
enforcement powers under Section 10(b) rings throughout the six-Justice 
majority opinion.350 The unanimous opinion in SEC v. Zandford351 reflects 
similarly strong deference to the SEC’s argument that Section 10(b)’s “in 
connection with” requirement should be read broadly to impose liability 
against a broker who misappropriated the proceeds from the sale of 
securities in his clients’ account.352 And while the Court in Stoneridge denied 
the private plaintiffs’ claim for recovery, it did so in a way that preserved the 
government’s ability to pursue participants in fraudulent schemes as primary 
violators of Rule 10b-5.353 All of this works in favor of judicial recognition of 
a “fraud on investors” theory of insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5 
because, as we have seen, insider trading is an offense pursued primarily by 
the government—by the SEC in civil enforcement actions or by the DOJ in 
criminal actions.354
To be sure, certain interpretive difficulties attach to a theory of Rule 
10b-5 liability premised on the use of wrongfully obtained information in 
securities transactions. The greatest challenge, of course, would be in 
defining the scope of the wrongful conduct triggering the disclosure duty. 
Here, however, courts could seize upon well-recognized categories such as 
illegal acts (e.g., theft and bribery), breaches of fiduciary duty, breaches of 
confidentiality agreements, and tortious acts (e.g., deceit, conversion, 
 
 
increased “judicial hostility to expansive interpretations of the federal securities laws, especially 
in the context of private securities litigation and fraud-on-the-market lawsuits”). 
 349. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way 
Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 139–
40 (2002) (observing that since the retirement of Justice Powell, the current Supreme Court 
lacks an expert in securities law, and may thus be inclined to defer to the government as a 
recognized specialist); see also Mark J. Loewenstein, The Supreme Court, Rule 10b-5 and the 
Federalization of Corporate Law, 39 IND. L. REV. 17, 19 (2005) (observing that several Supreme 
Court decisions have “expanded the reach” of Rule 10b-5). 
 350. See supra text accompanying note 104 (quoting Professor Bainbridge’s statement that 
the O’Hagan majority “did essentially what the government told it to do”). 
 351. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002). 
 352. Id. at 819–20 (stating that the SEC’s “interpretation of the ambiguous text of § 10(b), 
in the context of formal adjudication, is entitled to deference if it is reasonable”) (citing United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 & n.12 (2001)). 
 353. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770 (holding that private plaintiffs cannot establish reliance 
and thus cannot state a claim under Rule 10b-5 against participants in a scheme to defraud, but 
observing that “if business operations are used, as alleged here, to affect securities markets, the 
SEC enforcement power may reach the culpable actors”). 
 354. See supra note 118 (discussing civil monetary penalties under Exchange Act Section 
21A and criminal penalties under Exchange Act Section 32(a)). Moreover, unlike in most Rule 
10b-5 cases where the private right of action is implied, in insider trading cases, Congress has 
expressly granted the right of action for contemporaneous traders. See id. (discussing Exchange 
Act Section 20A). 
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trespass, or invasions of privacy). Thus, the theory would extend to securities 
trading by computer hackers as well as to the person who absconds with a 
briefcase left unattended in a conference room. The theory would also 
encompass securities trading by insiders who misuse the corporation’s 
information for personal profit as well as by outsiders who misappropriate 
the information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the 
information (with or without brazen disclosure). In addition, the theory 
would extend to securities trading by persons who agree to maintain the 
confidentiality of information pertaining to a PIPE transaction, to persons 
who dupe others into revealing confidential information, and to 
cybersnoops and potentially some eavesdroppers, who violate established 
norms of privacy to gain their informational advantage.355
If the Supreme Court were to embrace a “fraud on investors” theory of 
insider trading liability, the SEC could also use its rulemaking powers under 
Section 10(b) to refine the theory’s parameters.
 
356 The SEC could, for 
instance, promulgate a definition of “wrongful trading” similar to the 
statutory proposal discussed in the previous section.357
V. CONCLUSION 
 The notice-and-
comment process entailed by such rulemaking would draw upon the 
collective expertise of securities issuers, market participants, investors, and 
the securities bar. This public participation would bolster not only the clarity 
of the “fraud on investors” theory, but also its legitimacy. Thus, a regulatory 
definition would engender many of the same advantages as a statutory 
prohibition, but it could be accomplished more easily than legislation 
amending the Exchange Act. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s insistence that deception by a fiduciary is 
essential to the Rule 10b-5 insider trading offense, a host of lower courts and 
the SEC have disregarded this dictate when it forecloses liability against a 
person who has traded securities based on wrongfully obtained information. 
Courts and the SEC have also disregarded fiduciary principles when insiders 
have demonstrated that they are not misusing their corporation’s 
 
 355. The possibility of insider trading based on information obtained through 
eavesdropping brings to mind the facts of SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). 
There, the court concluded after an extensive bench trial that then Oklahoma football coach 
Barry Switzer did not violate Rule 10b-5 by purchasing stock in an acquisition target based on 
information that he overheard at a high school track meet. Id. at 758, 761, 766. Under a “fraud 
on investors” theory, the result in Switzer likely would not change since the pertinent 
conversation occurred in a public venue where an expectation of privacy would not have been 
reasonable. 
 356. SEC rulemaking in this area would be futile absent the Court’s recognition of a “fraud 
on investors” theory of insider trading liability. That is, in the absence of such recognition, an 
SEC rule prohibiting “wrongful trading” would surely be challenged as inconsistent with the 
holdings in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan. 
 357. See supra text accompanying notes 299–300. 
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information. These recent court decisions, settlements, and SEC rules reflect 
an evolving consensus that insider trading involves the wrongful use of 
confidential information. And while this view can be justified by the policy 
objectives underlying the Supreme Court’s decisions, it currently lacks a 
solid doctrinal foundation. The gradual demise of fiduciary principles 
indicates an insider trading jurisprudence that is sorely in need of an 
overhaul—whether by Congress, the SEC, or the federal courts charged with 
interpreting Rule 10b-5. 
